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Abstract
Human and fundamental rights are powerful legal means 
to protect and promote human dignity. On the one hand, 
the recognition of implicit and new rights appears un-
avoidable and desirable as history and its evolving cir-
cumstances permanently present new challenges to hu-
man dignity. On the other hand, an artificial proliferation 
of rights can weaken rights’ legal and political worth. The 
rights system cannot expand limitless, hence criteria to 
test new rights must be construed in the search of ad-
equate parameters to update the system. These criteria 
should reveal the presence of substantial fundamentality 
in rights not explicitly or formally enshrined in the consti-
tutional text. The testing path of new rights is conceived 
as a discursive process which reinforces the mutual rela-
tion between rights and democracy.
Keywords: fundamental and human rights; rights sys-
tem; new rights; scrutinizing criteria; substantial funda-
mentality; rights overreach; democracy and rights. 
Resumo
Os direitos humanos e fundamentais são poderosos instru-
mentos jurídicos para proteger e promover a dignidade da 
pessoa humana. Por um lado, o reconhecimento de direitos 
implícitos e novos direitos se mostra inevitável e desejável, 
uma vez que o evolver histórico sempre coloca renovados 
desafios à dignidade da pessoa humana. Por outro lado, 
uma proliferação artificial de direitos pode enfraquecer seu 
valor jurídico e político. O sistema de direitos não pode se 
expandir de forma ilimitada; é então necessária a constru-
ção de critérios para buscar uma adequada parametrização 
da atualização desse sistema. Esses critérios devem revelar 
a presença de fundamentalidade material em direitos que 
não foram previstos de maneira expressa no texto consti-
tucional. O caminho para testar novos direitos é concebido 
como um processo discursivo que reforça a relação mútua 
entre direitos e democracia.
Palavras-chave: direito fundamentais e humanos; 
sistema de direitos; novos direitos; critérios para testar 
novos direitos; fundamentalidade material; proliferação de 
direitos; democracia e direitos.
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1. INTRODUCTION
 This paper is built upon the characterization of the fundamental rights system 
in the constitutional state. In such state – based on the principles of rule of law, democ-
racy and welfare –, human dignity assumes the central role in the legal order. Human 
dignity is concretized by fundamental rights, which are not confined to a subjective 
dimension nor to the classical public liberties. Fundamental rights embrace the ex-
pansive potentialities of dignity, which constantly faces new necessities and threats. 
The protection of dignity, hence, requires the permanent updating of the fundamental 
rights system, imposing its construction as an open system. 
The conception of openness developed in the paper cannot be reduced to the 
existence of explicit open clauses, often present in contemporary constitutions, it iden-
tifies a much broader phenomenon. Openness manifests itself in the interpretation and 
creation of norms through different paths – structural, derived from an implicit princi-
ple of openness, and resulting from the interaction between national law and interna-
tional law –, and counting on various ways of realization. Openness enables to welcome 
implicit and new rights into the system1.
The acknowledgment of the open character of the system has multiple conse-
quences to this very system, such as the danger of an artificial recognition of funda-
mental rights, and to the constitutional system, namely to the separation of powers 
and constitutional normativity. Openness presents the risk of weakening these systems’ 
normative force. 
The paper is an attempt to offer theoretical foundations to the openness of the 
fundamental rights system. The goal is to preserve the core values and elements of the 
1  The core ideas concerning the open nature of the fundamental rights system were initially developed in 
my Ph.D thesis (NETTO, Luísa Cristina Pinto e. A abertura do sistema de direitos fundamentais do Estado 
Constitucional. Curitiba: Íthala, 2016).
The original argumentation is being revisited and enriched during the postdoc research periods at the Amster-
dam Centre for International Law, Amsterdam University (ACIL – UvA), and at Leiden University. These postdoc 
periods were made possible due to institutional support provided by the General State Attorney Office for the 
state of Minas Gerais, the Catholic University of Minas Gerais, and by the universities of Amsterdam and Leiden, 
where I was welcomed by Professor Yvonne Donders and Professor Wim Voermans, respectively.
The present paper aims to update and deepen those ideas, putting them into discussion within a broader En-
glish-speaking audience. New insights and argumentation regard especially the international law on human 
rights, the relation between rights and democracy, and the challenges posed by an alleged rights overreach. 
Relevant literature has also been incorporated.
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system and prevent the denaturation of the concept of fundamental rights. The system 
of fundamental rights cannot expand limitless; openness must be combined with some 
degree of closure, protecting rights against artificial proliferation.
This is the challenge the paper aims to face; to present and discuss some criteria 
to identify the substantial fundamentality in rights which are not formally enshrined in 
constitutional provisions. These criteria should guide the test of new rights which claim 
compensatory constitutionalization, parametrizing the update of the system.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section offers the underlying con-
ception of the legal system of the constitutional state. The second section provides an 
overview of the fundamental rights system, exposing its axial elements. The third sec-
tion presents the understanding of the openness of the fundamental rights system, 
explaining how the compensatory constitutionalization of new rights can occur. The 
fourth section delves into the criteria developed to test the substantial fundamentality 
of new rights. At the end some closing remarks are advanced pointing to possible fur-
ther research paths.  
2. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
The possible institutional scenario needed to approach the theme can be draf-
ted departing from the generic concept of a democratic nation, suggested by Mark 
Tushnet2; a state built upon the principles of (i) the rule of law3, (ii) democracy4 and (iii) 
2  TUSHNET, Mark. Weak courts, strong rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
3 SANCHÍS, Luis Prieto. Justicia constitucional y derechos fundamentales. Madrid: Trotta, 2003, p. 12-
13/25; GRIMM, Dieter. The achievement of constitutionalism and its prospects in a changed world. In: DOBNER, 
Petra; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The twilight of constitutionalism? Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 10; ALLAN, T. R. S.. Con-
stitutional rights and the rule of law. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of 
Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 132-142.
4  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The inclusion of the other: studies in political theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998; 
HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 
2012. p. 144-146; STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; 
KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 22 ss; 
HESSE, Konrad. Significado de los derechos fundamentales. In: BENDA, Ernst; MAIHOFER, Werner; VOGEL, Hans-
-Jochen; HESSE, Konrad; HEYDE, Wolfgang. Manual de derecho constitucional. 2.ed. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 
2001, p. 89-90; BÖCKENFÖRDE, Ernest-Wolfgang. Estudios sobre el Estado de Derecho y la democracia. Ma-
drid: Trotta, 2000, p. 92 ss; WALDRON, Jeremy. Derecho y desacuerdos. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005; DWORKIN, 
Ronald. Taking rights seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978; ALEXY, Robert. Comments and 
responses. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Ox-
ford, 2012, p. 330; ALEXY, Robert. La institucionalización de los derechos humanos en el Estado constitucional 
democrático. Derechos y libertades: Revista del Instituto Bartolomé de las Casas. Madrid, ano V, n. 8, ene./
jun., 2000, p. 40; ALEXY, Robert. Basic rights and democracy in Jürgen Habermas’s procedural paradigm of the 
law. Ratio juris, v. 7, n. 2, jul., 1994, p. 232-235; PULIDO, Carlos Bernal. El principio de proporcionalidad y los 
derechos fundamentales: el principio de proporcionalidad como criterio para determinar el contenido de los 
derechos fundamentales vinculante para el Legislador. 3.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estúdios Políticos y Constitu-
cionales, 2007, p. 203-206; BOROWSKI, Martin. La restricción de los derechos fundamentales. Revista Española 
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social welfare5. The power in this state is constrained by a constitution, which is based 
on the norm of human dignity and offers ground for the entire legal system.
In this legal institutional design, the rule of law asserts the importance of law as 
limit and guide to state action. Law is democratically established through the political 
participation of citizens which are necessarily entitled to legal specific precipitations of 
human dignity, i.e., fundamental rights. These rights are not confined to public liberties 
or to the classical negative rights but also impose duties on state towards securing mi-
nimum conditions of welfare.
The legal system of this democratic or constitutional state (hereafter interchan-
geably referred) is an ensemble of norms systematically ordered which holds unity and 
coherence. Frictions between norms which rest upon axiological tensions may occur 
and should be approached relying on the system’s appetence towards coherent unity. 
Moreover, this ensemble of norms is not complete or closed, but evolutive, what leads 
to another characteristic: openness. These characteristics sustain the conception of law 
as a system structured not only on logical or formal deductions, but on substantial and 
axiological relations among its norms6.
Furthermore, the legal system holds a claim to correctness7. This claim, using Ro-
bert Alexy’s construction, exposes the assumption that there is a necessary connection 
between law and morality8. Law ought to be regarded and structured as a pathway to 
de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid, ano 20, n. 59, mayo-agosto, 2000, p. 48; MAIHOFER, Werner. Principios de 
una democracia en libertad. In: BENDA, Ernst; MAIHOFER, Werner; VOGEL, Hans-Jochen; HESSE, Konrad; HEY-
DE, Wolfgang. Manual de derecho constitucional. 2.ed. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001, p. 227 ss; ZAGREBELSKY, 
Gustavo. El derecho dúctil: ley, derechos, justicia. 8.ed. Madrid: Trotta, 2008, p. 60.
5  BENDA, Ernst. El Estado social de derecho. In: BENDA, Ernst; MAIHOFER, Werner; VOGEL, Hans-Jochen; HES-
SE, Konrad; HEYDE, Wolfgang. Manual de derecho constitucional. 2.ed. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001, p. 540-
541; STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, 
Paul (Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 24.
6  The systemic conception of law was develop mostly leaning on the construction of Claus-Wilhelm Canaris 
(CANARIS, Claus-Wilhelm. Pensamento sistemático e conceito de sistema na ciência do direito. 2.ed. Lis-
boa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996). To approach a systemic conception of law, contributions of other 
writers were also welcomed. See, among others BULYGIN, Eugenio; MENDONÇA, Daniel. Normas y sistemas 
normativos. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005; RÜTHERS, Bernd; FISCHER, Christian; BIRK, Axel. Rechtstheorie mit 
juristischer Methodenlehre. 6. Auf. München: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 88 ss; GUASTINI, Riccardo. Teoría e ideolo-
gía de la interpretación constitucional. Madrid: Trotta, 2008, p. 71-72; ALEXY, Robert. Rechtssystem und prak-
tische Vernunft. Rechtstheorie, 18. Band, 1987, Heft 4, p. 409 ss; MODUGNO, Franco. Interpretazione per valori 
e interpretazione costituzionale. In: AZZARITI, Gaetano. Interpretazione costituzionale. Torino: Giappichelli, 
2005, p. 70; LARENZ, Karl. Metodologia da ciência do direito. 3.ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 
1997.
7  GARDNER, John. How law claims, what law claims. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the 
jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 29-44. 
8  On the relation between law and morality, see ALEXY, Robert. On the thesis of a necessary connection 
between law and morality: Bulygin’s critique. Ratio juris, v. 13, n. 2, jun., 2000, p.138-147; ALEXY, Robert. 
Constitutional rights, balancing and rationality. Ratio juris, v. 16, n. 2, jun., 2003, p. 135; ALEXY, Robert. The 
nature of legal philosophy. Ratio juris, v. 17, n. 2, jun., 2004, p. 159-160/163 ss; ALEXY, Robert. Comments 
and responses. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: 
Oxford, 2012, p. 319-324; KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). 
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achieve goals related to correction and justice. Consequently, not every content should 
be possible within the legal system; its fundamental principles, as well as its rules, must 
be justifiable by means of rational arguments9. The claim to correctness imposes subs-
tantial requirements on the legal system. Nonetheless, it does not imply a metaphysi-
cal morality, instead, it relies on a universalist morality based on procedural discursive 
ethics10.
This conception of law, a systematic set of norms – rules and principles – that 
holds a claim to correctness, requires procedures to ensure rationality (“rationalitäts-
sichernde Prozedur”); the claim to correctness leads to a claim to justifiability. What is 
at stake is the rational grounding and evaluation of axiological choices and decisions. 
When law is conceived as related to morality, as an open system, legal argumentation 
becomes essential11.
From another perspective, the constitution is central to this conception of law. 
The constitution, with its undeniable normative nature, stands on the top of the legal 
system and congregates the most important decisions on the coexistence of the poli-
tical community and the state. This paramount legal ensemble has the role of consti-
tuting power, not only modifying it. In addition, it ought to guarantee the democratic 
exercise of political power, marking the procedural and substantial boundaries within 
which the democratic game can unfold legitimately12. Constitutional norms compose 
Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 12-13; GARDNER, John. 
How law claims, what law claims. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Rob-
ert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 29-44; MURPHY, Mark C.. Defect and deviance in natural law jurisprudence. 
In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 
54-60; SIECKMANN, Jan-R.. Los derechos fundamentales como princípios. In: SIECKMANN, Jan-R.. (ed.) La teoría 
principialista de los derechos fundamentales: estudios sobre la teoría de los derechos fundamentales de 
Robert Alexy. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2011, p. 38-39; POSCHER, Ralf. The principles theory: how many theories 
and what is their merit? In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. 
Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 221-229; BULYGIN, Eugenio. Alexy’s thesis of the necessary connection between law 
and morality. Ratio juris, v. 13, n. 2, jun., 2000, p. 133-137; HART, H. L. A. O conceito de direito. 5.ed. Lisboa: 
Calouste Gulbenkian, 2007, p. 201 ss. 
9  ALEXY, Robert. On the thesis of a necessary conexion between law and morality: Bulygin’s critique. Ratio 
juris, v. 13, n. 2, jun., 2000, p.138-147; SANCHÍS, Luis Prieto. Justicia constitucional y derechos fundamental-
es. Madrid: Trotta, 2003, p. 97.
10  On the claim to correctness, see ALEXY, Robert. Comments and responses. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Insti-
tutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 319-322; KLATT, Matthias. 
Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurispru-
dence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, pp. 5; GARDNER, John. How law claims, what law claims. In: KLATT, 
Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 29-44.
11  ALEXY, Robert. Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft. Rechtstheorie, 18. Band, 1987, Heft 4, p. 416 ss; 
ALEXY, Robert. A theory of legal argumentation: the theory of rational discourse as theory of legal justifica-
tion. Oxford University Press, 2010.
12  See, among others, HESSE, Konrad. Constitución y derecho constitucional. In: BENDA, Ernst; MAIHOFER, 
Werner; VOGEL, Hans-Jochen; HESSE, Konrad; HEYDE, Wolfgang. Manual de derecho constitucional. 2.ed. 
Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001, p. 2 ss; GRIMM, Dieter. Constitucionalismo y derechos fundamentales. Madrid: 
Trotta, 2006, p. 27 ss; ZAGREBELSKY, Gustavo. El derecho dúctil: ley, derechos, justicia. 8.ed. Madrid: Trotta, 
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a system which combines impositions, prohibitions and permissions concerning the 
state powers13.
The constitution is a key legal element in the social plurality of the democratic 
state. Still departing from a monistic legitimacy foundation, through the affirmation of 
the democratic principle combined with popular sovereignty, the constitution appe-
ars as the central and paramount normative element that guarantees state unity and 
drives political processes. The constitution becomes a “concrete-historical order of secu-
larized and pluralist political societies”, an essential element in the face of the growing 
axiological cleavages which inform the constitutional consent and are present in the 
constitutional practice14.
In addition, fundamental rights understood as principles have a substantial im-
pact on the conception of the constitution15. Within the legal system of the democratic 
2008, p. 39 ss; GUASTINI, Riccardo. Teoría e ideología de la interpretación constitucional, p. 48-49; ALEXY, 
Robert. Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft. Rechtstheorie, 18. Band, 1987, Heft 4, p. 405.
13  ALEXY, Robert. A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; ALEXY, Robert. 
Comments and responses. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert 
Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 343. See also JESTAEDT, Matthias. The doctrine of balancing: its strengths and 
weaknesses. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: 
Oxford, 2012, p. 167-169; KUMM, Mattias. Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights and the problem of judicial 
review. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 
2012, p. 209 ss; KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institu-
tionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 16: POSCHER, Ralf. The princi-
ples theory: how many theories and what is their merit? In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the 
jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 218-247; SIECKMANN, Jan-R.. Los derechos fundamen-
tales como princípios. In: SIECKMANN, Jan-R.. (ed.) La teoría principialista de los derechos fundamentales: 
estudios sobre la teoría de los derechos fundamentales de Robert Alexy. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2011, p. 27-50: 
PULIDO, Carlos Bernal. El principio de proporcionalidad y los derechos fundamentales: el principio de pro-
porcionalidad como criterio para determinar el contenido de los derechos fundamentales vinculante para el 
Legislador. 3.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estúdios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2007. 883 p; POSCHER, Ralf. Aciertos, 
errores y falso autoconcepto de la teoría de los princípios. In: SIECKMANN, Jan-R.. (ed.) La teoría principialista 
de los derechos fundamentales: estudios sobre la teoría de los derechos fundamentales de Robert Alexy. 
Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2011, p. 71-92.
14  ZAGREBELSKY, Gustavo. El derecho dúctil: ley, derechos, justicia. 8.ed. Madrid: Trotta, 2008, p. 12-13/37-
39/114 ss/151 ss; SANCHÍS, Luis Prieto. Justicia constitucional y derechos fundamentales. Madrid: Trotta, 
2003, p. 122-124.
15  The expression chosen to refer these rights in this paper is “fundamental rights” as it is at the moment, to 
a certain extent, an acquis in many domestic traditions and constitutions, such as in the Portuguese speak-
ing countries (“direitos fundamentais”), in many Spanish speaking countries (“derechos fundamentales”), in Italy 
(“diritti fondamentali”) and even in France, the crib of public liberties (“droits fondamentaux”). In the German 
scenario, the expression commonly found is “Grundrechte” which would possibly lead to different translation 
options, such as basic rights. In Dutch one would also speak of “grondrechten”. It seems relevant to note that 
Robert Alexy wrote his theory on the “Grundrechte” (Theorie der Grundrechte) which has been translated in 
Spanish and Portuguese using the expression “fundamental rights”. Nonetheless, in the English translation the 
expression chosen was “constitutional rights” (ALEXY, Robert. A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
Having exposed the translation idiosyncrasies, what should be held is that these are the rights that structure 
the relation between individuals and the state and to some extent between individuals and private actors 
yielding power. These rights are regarded as so important that they deserve guarantee on the constitution-
al level, so they combine their substantial importance with a formal normative status that enables them to 
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state, the set of fundamental rights gains relevance, tracing the individual status vis a 
vis the state and in many aspects vis a vis other individuals and organizations16. The 
democratic state is impregnated by fundamental rights (grundrechtsdurchdrungenen 
Verfassungsstaat), whose systemic structuration takes part in building the state identi-
ty17. In other words, the set of fundamental rights is required to enable law to fulfil the 
claim to correctness.
Specifically considered, fundamental rights are legal subjective advantage po-
sitions linked (in distinct intensity) to human dignity. This relation to human dignity 
reveals the substantial fundamentality of the rights. Fundamental rights are positivized 
in a state legal order, preferably in its constitution, as legal norms with subjective and 
objective content, safeguarded against and through state powers. Nonetheless, fun-
damental rights, even regarded as positivized legal norms, should not be conceived as 
pure states’ concessions towards individuals. They are necessary norms in a democratic 
state legal system because they are the most concrete and specific legal protection for 
human dignity.
As fundamental rights are positivized in the constitution, they profit from formal 
fundamentality; they explicitly have constitutional status. The theoretical and practical 
consequences of this status can be found in the protection granted to constitutional 
norms, as they are situated on the top of the normative hierarchy. On the one hand, fun-
damental rights norms are protected from the ordinary legislative activity and require, 
in general, special procedures to be modified through constitutional amendment. On 
the other hand, they claim a minimum of effectiveness imposing legislative and execu-
tive action, as well as judicial activity in case of violation. 
The paramount set of norms organized in the constitution is meant to have 
some stability and endure historical changes. Nevertheless, to persevere through time, 
constitution must combine a stable core identity with the possibility of adaptation. 
Through evolutive interpretation and amendments, the constitution can live up to new 
needs and burdens laid on the legal system.
In the same way, the enumeration of constitutional rights should not be immu-
table. It is not feasible that the constituent power would be able to write down all ri-
ghts required to warrant human dignity. Even if the enumeration of rights could be 
protect human dignity. Substantial fundamentality is conjugated with formal fundamentality, i.e., the positi-
vation in the Constitution to save them from political conjunctural majorities. See on this positivation HESSE, 
Konrad. Constitución y derecho constitucional. In: BENDA, Ernst; MAIHOFER, Werner; VOGEL, Hans-Jochen; 
HESSE, Konrad; HEYDE, Wolfgang. Manual de derecho constitucional. 2.ed. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001, p. 
5; STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul 
(Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 12/20 ss.
16  STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul 
(Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 21
17  STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul 
(Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 5.
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adequate at a specific historical time, the evolving circumstances would always be able 
to present renewed challenges either to human dignity or to is integration in the poli-
tical community.
The recognition of the incompleteness or openness of the constitutional enu-
meration of rights brings to light that not all the rights that carry substantive funda-
mentality are constitutionally positivized and might claim compensatory constitutio-
nalization, to borrow Anne Peters’ expression18.
Even though the idea of openness of the set of fundamental or human rights19 is 
not novel, it requires being systematically addressed20. The following section attempts 
to present this systematic approach.
3. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTIO-
NAL STATE 
Notwithstanding the existence of remarkably diverse concrete fundamen-
tal rights systems enshrined in the various domestic constitutions21, it is possible to 
work with a generalization, likewise above suggested regarding the democratic or 
18  PETERS, Anne. Compensatory constitutionalism: the function and potential of fundamental international 
norms and structures. Leiden Journal of International Law. Vol. 19, pp. 579-610, 2006.
19  Fundamental and human rights cannot simply be considered synonyms. They constitute close but differen-
tiated categories. “Fundamental rights” is the expression that more precisely indicates human rights that have 
been positivized in a domestic legal order, i.e., that are foremost enshrined by constitutional provisions. This 
definition brings about important consequences on the enforcement and justiciability of these rights in the 
domestic arena. “Human rights” are a broader concept that goes beyond domestic legal orders and constitu-
tional positivation; these rights claim to be universal and, to a certain extent, they impose themselves to states 
departing from various international law norms. The expressions are often used interchangeably, not disre-
garding these differences. In fact, beyond these differences it is possible to point out many rapprochements 
and the undeniable mutual influence exercised by both the fundamental rights systems and the international 
human rights system.
20  Much has been written on “constitutional open clauses”, but not much can be found on the broader open-
ness phenomenon. About open clauses, see, for a first approach, in the United States: TRIBE, Laurence H. Amer-
ican constitutional law. 2.ed. New York: The Foundation Press, 1988, p. 774-775. In Portugal: GOUVEIA, Jorge 
Bacelar. Os direitos fundamentais atípicos. Lisboa: Aequitas, 1995, p. 152ss; MIRANDA, Jorge. A abertura con-
stitucional a novos direitos fundamentais. Estudos em homenagem ao professor doutor Manuel Gomes da 
Silva. Coimbra: Coimbra, 2001, p. 562-563; CANOTILHO, J. J. Gomes. Direito constitucional e teoria da con-
stituição. 7.ed. Coimbra: Almedina, 2003, p. 403ss; OTERO, Paulo. Direitos históricos e não tipicidade pretérita 
dos direitos fundamentais. In: Ab vno ad omnes: 75 anos da Coimbra Editora. Coimbra: Coimbra, 1995, p. 
1061-1090; ALEXANDRINO, José de Melo. A estruturação do sistema de direitos, liberdades e garantias na 
constituição portuguesa: a construção dogmática. v. II. Coimbra: Almedina, 2006, p. 381ss. In Brazil: SARLET, 
Ingo Wolfgang. A eficácia dos direitos fundamentais. 10.ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2009, p. 
90ss; TRINDADE, Antônio Augusto Cançado. Tratado de direito internacional dos direitos humanos. v. II. 
Porto Alegre: Sergio Antonio Fabris, 1999; PIOVESAN, Flávia. Direitos humanos e o direito constitucional 
internacional. 13.ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2012.
21  Every concrete system carries specificities and is to a certain extent product of social, historical, cultural and 
economic circumstances (STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, 
Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 47; 
PECES-BARBA MARTÍNEZ, Gregorio; ASÍS ROIG, Rafael; BARRANCO AVILÉS, María del Carmen. Lecciones de 
derechos fundamentales. Madrid: Dykinson, 2004, p. 249).
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constitutional state. The aim is to approach this general rights system of the consti-
tutional state; to reveal the components inherent to fundamental rights norms; to ad-
vance their sustaining principles (tragenden PrInzipien) and their meaning connections 
(SInnzusammenhänge). The underlying purpose is to order the fundamental rights 
norms to fulfil theoretical and practical goals. This purpose is grounded on the premise 
that there is an inherent systemic connection linking the fundamental contents; fun-
damental rights converge into a system (systemkonvergent)22. The system is not axiom-
atic, logical or deductive, its inner connections derive from its positivized axiological 
content.
Based on these ideas, the structuration of the fundamental rights system can be 
embedded in its substantive connections and developed departing from the following 
elements23:
1. Structuring elements: human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity;
2. Forming elements – fundamental rights norms: explicit positivation, joint 
positivation of liberty rights and social rights (negative and positive rights), 
indivisibility and interdependence of various categories of rights, positiva-
tion through a combined model of rules and principles, restrictability;
3. Warranting elements – norms on fundamental rights: efficacy provisions, li-
mits on limits, endurance ability, legal protection, support on international 
norms.
These elements will not be deeply analysed in this paper; instead, they are 
shortly named to contextualize the axial ideas underlying the systemic conception of 
rights24.
The structuring elements are the ones on which the system relays, they serve as 
axiological and substantive foundations to the system, providing coherence and unity.
The first structuring element is human dignity. The conception of human dignity 
rests upon jusnaturalist roots25, specially laid down in the western tradition by Imma-
nuel Kant. Human dignity, as the core of human personality, marks the boundaries for 
the relations between state and individuals and between individuals. For Kant, the in-
dividual is always an end in itself and never a means; each and every person is worthy 
and deserves to be respected. Dignity places every individual in equal standing, even 
if formally; every individual has equal dignity and ought to respect others’ dignities. 
22  STERN, Klaus. Idee und Elemente eines Systems der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). 
Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 63.
23  For a complete development of these ideas, see A abertura do sistema de direitos fundamentais do 
Estado Constitucional. Curitiba: Íthala, 2016.
24  For a deeper development on the rights system, see NETTO, Luísa Cristina Pinto e. A abertura do sistema 
de direitos fundamentais do Estado Constitucional. Curitiba: Íthala, 2016.
25  STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul 
(Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 6 ss.
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Moreover, dignity has no price; it has an absolute value. In the Kantian construction, 
dignity finds its foundation in autonomy; autonomy, in its turn, finds limits in dignity26.
The importance of moral considerations on human dignity is undoubtful. None-
theless, human dignity must also be regarded as a legal norm enshrined in the cons-
titution as the foundation of the legal system, precipitating into specific fundamental 
rights norms27. Besides these core ideas, it is essential to conceive dignity in a social 
insertion of the individual, connecting him or her to the political community and with 
his or her multiple roles, as a person, citizen, worker, and as an inhabitant of a planet 
with limited resources.
From another perspective, it is relevant to advance that human dignity, as the 
grounding norm of the legal system, must be approached as an open conception, not 
as an official concept. The protection offered by this legal norm also assures that each 
individual is entitled to defining his or her own understanding of dignity, within the es-
sential boundaries of the system28. Human dignity is the ultimate goal of fundamental 
rights and it works as a door to the updating re-readings of fundamental rights norms29.
In addition to human dignity, there are other structural elements: freedom, 
equality, solidarity. Hereby, freedom is briefly understood as protection against the 
state and through the state; it refers to the idea of restraining power by law to favour 
the individual. Freedom was the first substantial grounding for rights, revealing their 
first defensive function30. Departing from a formal conception, freedom unfolded into 
a sphere of factual consideration, which requires the possibility and the means for in-
dividuals to determine their own life choices and to equally participate in the political 
community31. Freedom in the constitutional state is not absolute; it is social bond and 
26  KANT, Immanuel. Groundwork of the metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge.
27  ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales. 2.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Con-
stitucionales, 2007, p. 106-109/344-345; PECES-BARBA MARTÍNEZ, Gregorio; ASÍS ROIG, Rafael; BARRANCO 
AVILÉS, María del Carmen. Lecciones de derechos fundamentales. Madrid: Dykinson, 2004, p. 248.
28  STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul 
(Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 7; BENDA, Ernst. Dignidad 
humana y derechos de la personalidad, p. 124; ZAGREBELSKY, Gustavo. El derecho dúctil: ley, derechos, justi-
cia. 8.ed. Madrid: Trotta, 2008, p. 17-18.
29  HABERMAS, Jürgen. O conceito de dignidade humana e a utopia realista dos direitos humanos. In: HABER-
MAS, Jürgen. Sobre a constituição da Europa: um ensaio. São Paulo: Unesp, 2012, p. 9-10; BENDA, Ernst. 
Dignidad humana y derechos de la personalidad, p. 117; STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität 
der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. 
Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 7; HESSE, Konrad. Significado de los derechos fundamentales, p. 87.
30  STERN, Klaus. Idee und Elemente eines Systems der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). 
Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, p. 97-98; STERN, Klaus. Idee der Mens-
chenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats 
Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 21; GRIMM, Dieter. Constitucionalismo y derechos 
fundamentales. Madrid: Trotta, 2006, p. 77 ss.
31  ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales. 2.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Cons-
titucionales, 2007, p. 494 ss.
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parametrized by the other constituent values of the legal order, such as equality, solida-
rity and the duties imposed by sustainability32.
Equality, concisely considered as a structuring element of the rights system, me-
ans equal treatment and consideration33 by the state concerning actions and absten-
tions and equal participation in the exercise of democratic political power34. Moreover, 
equality goes hand in hand with an idea of justice incorporated in the legal system; 
equality legitimated as an open space where different conceptions of justice welcomed 
by the constitution can confront themselves through democratic processes and pursue 
actualization35. 
In a nutshell, for its turn, solidarity participates in structuring the system by im-
posing to the state the fulfilment of duties of welfare required by human dignity. The 
state has to warrantee a minimum material support for a dignified life by means of 
actions and abstentions, normative and concrete behaviours. Besides, the state ought 
to interact with society aiming at welfare. Solidarity as an element of the fundamental 
rights system enables to conceive freedom and equality in a not antagonistic or incom-
patible relation. Therefore, sociality becomes a constitutive aspect of freedom, it im-
poses duties on state and urges the participation of society in the pursuit of collective 
welfare. From another point of view, solidarity conveys to the system a new role for ri-
ghts; fundamental rights demand the preservation of the planet for future generations 
and other species.
In conjunction with these structuring elements, the system holds forming ele-
ments, which concern the nature of the fundamental rights norms themselves and how 
they are positivized. In the democratic state, the rights system requires explicit positiva-
tion of fundamental rights norms, it is not enough to establish general clauses, such as 
human dignity, rule of law or welfare state. Constitutional norms must directly convey 
fundamental rights and combine negative with positive rights36.
From a theoretical point of view, which depends on the wording of the consti-
tutional provisions, fundamental rights ought to be conceived in a combined model of 
rules and principles37. On the one hand, rules provide for immediate normative answers 
delivering security and determinability. On the other hand, principles function as res-
pirators to the system due to their more general and comprehensive regulation ability 
32  STERN, Klaus. Idee und Elemente eines Systems der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). 
Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 53.
33  DWORKIN, Ronald. Taking rights seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. 
34  STERN, Klaus. Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul 
(Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 22-23
35  ZAGREBELSKY, Gustavo. El derecho dúctil: ley, derechos, justicia. 8.ed. Madrid: Trotta, 2008, p. 95 ss.
36  WEBER, Albrecht. L’État social et les droits sociaux en RFA. Révue française de droit constitutionnel, Paris, 
n. 24, 1995, p. 681.
37  ALEXY, Robert. A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 80 ss.
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and their behaviour in normative conflicts. Besides, principles lead to conceive rights as 
more far-reaching than their minimum or core contents, they enable the idea of prima 
facie norms38 (also of “rights as a whole” or “cluster-rights”). On top of this, principles 
elucidate that every right in the system is intrinsically restrictable39. 
In addition to the specific fundamental rights norms, the system encompasses 
norms on rights, norms that discipline the regulatory behaviour of rights norms. These 
norms on norms are the warranting elements of the system. In this general system here 
briefly presented, norms that establish the efficacy of fundamental rights norms are 
warranting elements; they may grant fundamental rights norms immediate efficacy 
and they regulate fundamental rights norms interpretation. Within the warranting el-
ements, norms concerning the legal means of protecting fundamental rights ought 
to be established, such as access to justice, judicial protection with its processual and 
procedural means. 
Because fundamental rights often demand legislative action in order to be ef-
fective, constitutional norms which provide protection against insufficient or erosive 
legislative action should also figure among the warranting elements of the system. Be-
yond that, a crucial warranting element concerns the protection of fundamental rights 
against constitutional amendments, providing them some capacity to resist, guaran-
teeing them the status of substantive limitations on constitutional amendments.
Finally, the protection required by fundamental rights also rests on the inter-
action between national and international law. Constitutional provisions that anchor 
domestic fundamental rights in international law and open the domestic legal order to 
international norms are essential warranting elements of the rights system.
These are the axial guidelines which allow to understand the set of rights in the 
constitutional state as a system and pave the path for exposing the open nature of this 
system. As a matter of fact, openness itself, which will be addressed in the following 
section, constitutes an overarching warranting element of the rights system.
4. THE OPENNESS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SYSTEM – 
COMPENSATORY CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RIGHTS 
The rights system of the constitutional state as here conceived is an open sys-
tem; it is not immutable nor complete, it is capable of welcoming renewed interpreta-
tions and new rights. The openness of the system appears threefold; it is a structural 
condition; it is commanded by an implicit principle; and it is imposed by international 
law. Furthermore, openness operates on two levels, not always wholly distinguishable: 
interpretation and creation of norms.
38  ALEXY, Robert. A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 57-59.
39  ALEXY, Robert. A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
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In order to affirm openness as an intrinsic characteristic of the system, grou-
nding reasons must be presented. First, structural openness is a consequence of the 
nature of legal norms, of the wording of constitutional norms and of the presence of 
positivized general clauses and general rights. Structural openness converges to the 
open texture of law, as shall be explained hereafter.
From another perspective, since the assumption is that openness, in one of its 
façades, is an implicit principle which belongs to the system, it is imperative to advan-
ce its normative anchors. In the domestic constitutional order, a general foundation 
for the principle of openness can be found in the norm of human dignity and in the 
democratic principle. A specific foundation should be sought in constitutional explicit 
open clauses; in norms which determine the reception of international law norms; in 
explicit norms of fundamental rights (general or specific rights); in norms which esta-
blish fundamental rights regime; and in norms which grant legislative and constitutio-
nal amendment competences. All these explicit norms offer normative foundation to 
an implicit principle which commands that the rights system must evolve to protect 
human dignity.
Finally, openness towards international law can be justified by means of consti-
tutional provisions which determine the domestic incorporation of international nor-
ms, as well as provisions which recognize guiding interpretative authority to internatio-
nal norms and standards. In addition, it is possible to affirm that openness is imposed 
by international law based on the jus cogens nature of some of its norms. 
To make these ideas clearer, it seems adequate to address the various ways in 
which openness unfolds.
4.1. Structural openness
The legal system is understood as an open system and so is the fundamental 
rights one; an open set of principles and rules, with substantial unity, coherence and 
claim to correctness as briefly exposed above.
Openness derives from the characteristics of language, which inevitably leads to 
law’s open texture. The legal norm is not a given to be found or discovered but a mea-
ning to be construed departing from the text of the legal provision and from the other 
systemic legal elements. The norm is formulated through interpretation, which relies 
upon rational argumentative processes to support the meaning defended40. Interpre-
40  For a similar approach to interpretation, but then especially concerning international law, see VENZKE, 
Ingo. Understanding the authority of international courts and tribunals: on delegation and discursive con-
struction. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 14(2), 381-409, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2013-020; VENZKE, 
Ingo, Authoritative Interpretation (October 11, 2018) In: Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Proce-
dural Law; Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2018-28; Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 
2018-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3264566; VENZKE, Ingo, The Practice of Interpretation 
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tation reveals the probable and possible meanings that should be justifiable within the 
textual and systemic boundaries41. There is no such only one right meaning to be disco-
vered departing from every legal text or provision. On the contrary, there are various in-
terpretations that deliver possible norms which claim to be adequately and sufficiently 
justified. There is an indeterminacy in law which cannot be eliminated, even when it is 
desirable and viable to establish mechanisms to limit indeterminacy and enhance legal 
security. Indeterminacy is part of law’s nature42.
The open texture mentioned is even more present in constitutional provisions, 
including fundamental rights ones43,  for reasons that cannot be addressed in this oc-
casion. It is enough to notice the remarkable indeterminacy in the field of rights, which 
leads to the structural openness of the rights system.
On the structural level, it is possible to explore the phenomenon of construing 
unwritten or unenumerated rights: rights norms which are implicit in constitutional ge-
neral clauses and general rights. As Robert Alexy explains, “derivative norms”44 can be 
construed and grounded departing from other explicit constitutional norms. In fact, 
constitutional general clauses positivized as norms, such as human dignity, welfare sta-
te45, rule of law, equality, as well as general rights, such as general liberty right46, general 
in International Law: Strategies of Critique (September 10, 2018). Accepted paper In: International Legal 
Theory: Foundations and Frontiers (edited by Jeff Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, CUP 2019); Amsterdam Law School 
Research Paper No. 2018-22; Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 2018-07. Available at SSRN: https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3247125 .
41  On textual limits, among others, see SCHAUER, Frederick. Balancing, subsumption, and the constraining 
role of legal text. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: 
Oxford, 2012, p. 307-316.
42  Important input to the discussion on positivism, law’s indeterminacy and judicial discretion can be found 
comparing the contributions of Herbert L. A. Hart (HART, Herbert L. A. The concept of law. Oxford. 2012, es-
pecially p. 124 ss) and of Ronald Dworkin (DWORKIN, Ronald. Taking rights seriously. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1978; DWORKIN, Ronald. O império do direito. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1999; DWORKIN, 
Ronald. Uma questão de princípio. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000).
To approach the discussion, see SHAPIRO, Scott J., The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A short guide for the perple-
xed (March 5, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=968657 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.968657; BIX, Brian. H. L. A. Hart and the “Open Texture” of Language. Springer. Law and Philosophy, Vol. 
10, No. 1 (Feb., 1991); BIX, Brian. Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy. Published to Oxford Scholarship Onli-
ne: March 2012. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198260509.001.0001.
43  Calling attention to the open texture of law concerning human rights provisions, see ECKES, Chris-
tina. Integrated rights protection in the European and International Context: some reflections about limits 
and consequences. In GOVAERE, I., GARBEN, S. (Eds.). Interfaces between European and Internation-
al Law (pp. 101-124). (Modern Studies in European Law; Vol. 89). Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019. https://doi.
org/10.5040/9781509923410.
44  ALEXY, Robert. A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 38-43.
45  ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales. 2.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Con-
stitucionales, 2007, p. 419-420. See also, not necessarily with the same understanding, WEBER, Albrecht. L’État 
social et les droits sociaux en RFA. Révue française de droit constitutionnel, Paris, n. 24, 1995, p. 684-685.
46  STERN, Klaus. Idee und Elemente eines Systems der Grundrechte. In. ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). 
Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 2000, p. 97 ss.
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equality right47, right to the development of personality, make the structural openness 
patent in the field of fundamental rights. The general clauses and rights enable to an-
chor implicit or unwritten rights in their provisions; they provide legal reasons to justify 
the interpretative results which recognize these derivative norms as part of the system. 
In addition, the objective dimension of fundamental rights – a concept connected 
with the irradiating efficacy of fundamental rights48 – may be relevant in regard to the 
structural openness. The objective dimension determines that state powers ought to 
conform the legal system according to fundamental rights. State duties are to be deri-
ved from this objective dimension: duty to create and enact norms required by funda-
mental rights, duty to structure organization and procedures required by fundamental 
rights49. From this objective dimension, it is possible, under certain circumstances and 
with caution, to derive new subjective fundamental positions50 which update and en-
rich the system.
Another interpretative tool in the field of structural openness can be found in 
the conception of broad fundamental rights provisions51; their wide scope can unveil 
unpreceded fundamental subjective content.
Furthermore, it is relevant to mention Robert Alexy’s conception of rights as 
prInciples and his concept of right as a whole; both seem to be critical elements to the 
47  ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales. 2.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Cons-
titucionales, 2007, p. 381 ss/415 ss; PIEROTH, Bodo; SCHLINK, Bernhard. Grundrechte, Staatsrecht II, 11.ed., 
Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1995; MICHAEL, Lothar. Los derechos de igualdad como principios iusfundamentales. 
In: SIECKMANN, Jan-R.. (ed.) La teoría principialista de los derechos fundamentales: estudios sobre la teoría 
de los derechos fundamentales de Robert Alexy. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2011, p. 137-143.
48  GRIMM, Dieter. The role of fundamental rights after sixty-five years of constitutional jurisprudence in Ger-
many.  International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 13, Issue 1, January 2015, Pages 9–29, https://doi.
org/10.1093/icon/mov005.
49  For different understandings on the objective dimension, see ALEXY, Robert. Grundrecht als subjektive 
Rechte und als Objektive Normen. Der Staat, 29. Band, Heft 1, 1990, p. 49-68; BÖCKENFÖRDE, Ernst-Wolfgang. 
Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen. Der Staat (Zeitschrift für Staatslehre, öffentliches Recht und Verfassungs-
geschicht). 29. Band. Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 1990, p. 1-31.
50  This idea of deriving subjective advantage positions with fundamental content from objective norms is 
not new in the constitutional theory, although it is not free from controversy. It seems interesting that it also 
appears in international law, and even as controversial, as made clear with the following example presented 
by Catherine Brölmann and Christina Binder: “Finally, a particular category of interpretive questions is whether a 
treaty creates individual rights, even if not explicitly addressed to individuals in the way of a human rights treaty. 
A well‐known subject of debate is Article 36 of the Convention on Consular Relations, according to which local au-
thorities must notify all detained foreigners ‘without delay’ of their right to have their consulate informed of their 
detention. In Cornejo v County of San Diego and ors the Court held that this provision entailed no individual right.” 
(BRÖLMANN, Catherine, BINDER, Christina. The law of treaties before domestic courts and human rights 
bodies. Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-41 Amsterdam Center for International 
Law No. 2017-27.)
51  One can speak of broad interpretation or broad scope of rights (ALEXY, Robert. A theory of constitutional 
rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 201 ss). For an interesting approach specifically aimed at social 
and economic rights, see LEIJTEN Ingrid. Core socio-economic rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2018, p. 98 ss.
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idea sustained is this paper. Because principles are optimization commands52, funda-
mental rights as principles command to be fulfilled in the maximum possible extent, 
considering the factual and normative circumstances. This conception is based on the 
comprehension of principles encompassing prima facie and definitive norms.
All these theoretical constructions make it possible, departing from a funda-
mental right explicitly positivized in the constitution, from provisions that enshrine 
general rights or even from general constitutional clauses, to ground the interpretative 
result which recognizes and justifies new fundamental subjective contents.
International law also plays an important role in the structural openness. There 
are prominent examples of constitutional provisions that command the interpretation 
of national law according to international norms and standards, which could result in 
updating the domestic rights system. Additionally, the practice of regional and inter-
national courts should not be neglected. It exposes the renewing influence wielded 
by international law in the domestic interpretation of both national and international 
law. In this scenario, international law emerges, beyond the existence of binding norms, 
as an interpretative guideline. In domestic case law, it is possible to find references to 
treaties (with or without legal force) to support particular interpretations of domestic 
law, as pointed out by Catherine Brölmann and Christina Binder53. Besides traditional in-
ternational law, there are real speculations about an emerging global legal order which 
might be meaningful for the structural openness54.
At this point it is also relevant to consider the growing dialogue between seve-
ral national, regional, and international courts55. This dialogue reveals cases of evident 
mutual influence in what is being called constitutional borrowing when concerning 
domestic constitutional courts56.
52  ALEXY, Robert. A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 47-48.
53  They even give an example: “Next to interpretation of binding treaty norms, courts may adopt an interpretive 
discourse and refer to treaties without legal force in the domestic legal order, in order to support and legitimize a 
particular reading of a domestic legal provision. One example of such ‘treaty‐conform interpretation’ is the Engla-
ro case mentioned above.” (BRÖLMANN, Catherine, BINDER, Christina. The law of treaties before domestic 
courts and human rights bodies. Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-41 Amster-
dam Center for International Law No. 2017-27.) 
54  See, among others, KRISCH, Nico. Global administrative law and the constitutional ambition. In: DOBNER, 
Petra; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The twilight of constitutionalism? Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 245-266; CASSESE, Sa-
bino. La globalización jurídica. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006; TEUBNER, Gunther. Constitutional fragments: 
societal constitutionalism and globalization. Oxford: Oxford, 2012.
55  See NOLLKAEMPER, Andre, Conversations Among Courts: Domestic and International Adjudicators. In 
ALTER, Karin, ROMANO, Cesare, SHANY, Yuval (eds), Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP 2013, 
Forthcoming), Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2013-30, Amsterdam Center for International Law 
No. 2013-08, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2270565 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2270565; 
MAUS, Didier. Le recours aux précédents étrangers et le dialogue des cours constituionnelles. Revue française 
de droit constitutionnel. Paris, n. 80, oct., 2009, p. 675-696.
56  EPSTEIN, Lee; KNIGHT, Jack. Constitutional borrowing and non borrowing. International journal of con-
stitutional law. New York, v. 1, n. 2, ap. 2003, p. 196-223 GREWE, Constance. Les influences du droit allemand 
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Finally, constitutional mutation or constitutional evolutive interpretation must 
be addressed under the structural openness. New or renewed fundamental content 
can be construed as a result of the evolving meaning of constitutional provisions. The 
interpretation process of constitutional provisions is dynamic and can lead to new 
interpretive outcomes without changing the textual wording, without constitutional 
amendment procedures57. This evolutive interpretation unfolds namely in the practice 
of constitutional courts.
Judicial application of law, either in common law and or civil law systems, es-
pecially developed by constitutional courts, which create precedents or customary ju-
dicial law, should be preferably located within the interpretative field. The decisions 
that result from the application of law do not go beyond interpretation; they do not 
ordinarily create new norms58.
For its turn, the concretization of constitutional fundamental rights norms 
through further development by ordinary legislation appears to be somehow different. 
Because of the nature of constitutional provisions and their normative hierarchy, su-
pplementary legislative development is often required to make constitutional norms 
applicable and effective. This is particularly important in the domain of fundamental ri-
ghts. These rights claim legislative concretization, which can amplify fundamental con-
tents by rendering them specifically established and clarifying the states duties they 
impose. The legislative concretization of fundamental rights constitutional norms goes 
beyond interpretation and deliver new ordinary law norms.
To a certain extent it is viable to differentiate openness of the fundamental ri-
ghts system through interpretation and through the creation of norms. In other words, 
it is possible to distinguish between the recognition of implicit fundamental “new” 
content without constitutional amendment or legislative change and the addition of 
new fundamental content through the creation of new constitutional or ordinary legal 
des droits fondamentaux sur le droit français: le rôle médiateur de la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne 
des Droits de l’Homme. Révue universelle des droits de l’homme, 2004, oct., v. 16, n. 1-4, p. 26-32; ROSENK-
RANTZ, Carlos F. Against borrowings and other nonauthoritative uses of foreign law. Constitutional borrowing 
and non borrowing. International journal of constitutional law, New York, v. 1, n. 2, ap. 2003, p. 269-295. 
For an interesting approach on constitutional borrowing, with special attention to the use of proportionality, 
see ANDRADE NETO, João. Borrowing justification for proportionality: on the influence of the principles 
theory in Brazil. Springer, 2018.
57  Interpretation in international law may not be exactly the same as in constitutional law, but, besides spec-
ificities, the interpretative enterprise in both fields holds important common aspects. In this context, it is in-
teresting to quote Ingo Venzke on the possibility of changing in meaning without changing in the textual 
provision: “Be that as it may, an interpretation does not stop being an interpretation when it modifies the law.” 
(VENZKE, Ingo, Authoritative Interpretation (October 11, 2018) In: Max Planck Encyclopedia of International 
Procedural Law; Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2018-28; Amsterdam Center for International 
Law No. 2018-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3264566). See also JELLINEK, Georg. Reforma e 
mutación de la constitución. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1991.
58  PONTHOREAU, Marie-Claire. La reconnaisance des droits non-écrits par les cours constitutuionnelles 
italienne et française: essai sur le pouvoir créateur du juge constitutionnel. Paris: Economica, 1994.
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norms. Having presented how the structural openness can operate, it becomes clear 
it mainly arises on the interpretative level. It is important to note, however, that the 
judicial application of fundamental rights norms and the legislative concretization of 
fundamental rights might show that this differentiation is not absolute; the line betwe-
en interpretation and legal creation can be rather blurred.
Finally, it is important to notice that the assertion of an implicit principle that 
commands the updating of the fundamental rights system influences the structural 
openness. Indeterminacy and the open texture of law are a given and cannot be enti-
rely avoided. Nonetheless, these phenomena do not provide a normative guidance, an 
imposition on how structural openness of law should unfold. The principle of openness, 
if accepted as here advocated, lends a goal to the interpretation of fundamental rights 
provisions. The principle guides the interpretation, through indeterminacy and open 
texture, in the direction of actualizing and updating the norms and the system in favour 
of human dignity.
4.2. The principle of openness
One of the core arguments developed in this paper is that there is an impli-
cit principle of openness which commands state powers (branches) to implement a 
constant update of the fundamental rights system in order to guarantee full respect to 
human dignity through evolving historical circumstances. As (an implicit) a legal norm, 
this principle imposes a renewing interpretation of the already existing fundamental 
rights norms (and other relevant norms of the system) as well as the integration, crea-
tion, and enactment of new norms. The openness principle can, reversely, also impose 
some restrictive interpretation or normative restrictive changes as far as these can be 
required by the system as a whole.
This principle of openness cannot be identified with constitutional explicit open 
clauses; it is a broader principle whose regulation capacity goes way beyond what is 
commanded by specific open clauses59. 
Considering that such an openness principle is not an explicitly formulated 
norm in concrete constitutions, it requires an argumentative path able to anchor it in 
59  The implicit principle of openness can be seen as multifunctional, since it can possibly: warrant the central 
position of human dignity in the constitutional system; warrant and promote the dynamic respect for human 
dignity; warrant the structuring function of the human rights system within the constitutional system; warrant 
the unity of the constitution; preserve the constitution through its capacity to adapt; impose the permanent 
update of the fundamental rights system; impose a comprehensive interpretation of the fundamental rights 
norms; impose a favourable interpretation towards the recognition of implicit rights; warrant the legitimacy 
of judicial decisions which recognize implicit rights or deduct rights from constitutional norms; impose and 
legitimate the updating interpretation of the fundamental rights system through constitutional evolutive in-
terpretation; impose restrictive or accommodative modifications in the system if mandatory to update the 
system in the service of human dignity; impose the openness of national law towards international law.
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explicit existing provisions. The following directly established provisions and norms 
offer enough legal foundation to affirm that the principle is a derivative norm: cons-
titutional provisions concerning human dignity; the democratic principle; an explicit 
open clause (if present in the constitution); constitutional provisions on the reception 
of international norms and interpretation of domestic law according to international 
norms and standards; constitutional provisions specifically concerning fundamental 
rights; constitutional provisions that grant competence to constitutional amendment 
and legislative activity. Maybe it would be possible, in the European Union, to present 
an additional normative foundation to the principle of openness: the provisions which 
discipline the necessary interrelations between different fundamental rights regimes in 
order to achieve an adequate level of integration60.
All these norms and explicit constitutional provisions deliver enough normative 
foundation to anchor the implicit principle of openness, which emerges as a warranting 
element of the fundamental rights system of the constitutional state. In other words, 
they enable to affirm the principle as part of the domestic rights systems. The core nor-
mative content of the principle was exposed above and is mandatory either to interpre-
tation or to other state activities, especially the legislative one.
Openness is, therefore, threefold: structural, commanded by a principle and im-
posed by international law. Furthermore, openness operates on two levels, interpreta-
tion and the creation of norms. Before exposing the last façade of openness as imposed 
by international law is seems essential to address how it operates on the level of nor-
mative creation. 
4.3. Openness to receive new norms
The openness that operates beyond the interpretative level and means aggre-
gating new normative elements to the system may bring these new fundamental con-
tents inside through various doors.
A well-known door is represented by the explicit open clauses present in many 
contemporaneous constitutions. The existence of an explicit constitutional provision 
enshrining an open clause is a specific precipitation of the broader principle of open-
ness and can manifest in various concrete ways in different constitutional provisions. 
Such provisions can be found in the Brazilian Constitution (Art 5, paragraph 2: The ri-
ghts and guarantees expressed In this Constitution do not exclude others derivIng from the 
regime and from the prInciples adopted by it, or from the International treaties In which 
the Federative Republic of Brazil is a party.), in the IX Amendment to the Constitution of 
60  ECKES, Christina. Integrated rights protection in the European and International Context: some reflections 
about limits and consequences. In GOVAERE, I., GARBEN, S. (Eds.). Interfaces between European and Interna-
tional Law (pp. 101-124). (Modern Studies in European Law; Vol. 89). Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019. https://doi.
org/10.5040/9781509923410).
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the United States of America (The enumeration In the Constitution, of certaIn rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retaIned by the people.)61, in the Portuguese 
Constitution (Art. 16. n. 1: The fundamental rights enshrIned In the Constitution shall not 
exclude any others set out In applicable International laws and legal rules.), to quote only 
a few examples. 
It seems clear that an explicit open clause can also have an impact on the inter-
pretative level, since unwritten rights can be implicit, deriving from existing constitu-
tional provisions. Nonetheless, explicit open clauses exercise a more central role in the 
openness of the system beyond the interpretative level or even in the blurred space 
between interpretation and new normative content creation and enactment. This is the 
terrain where open clauses make it irrefutable that new content ought to be accepted 
into the system.
This is no neutral data for the argumentative process in favour of opening the 
system towards welcoming new fundamental content. The importance of such an ex-
plicit open clause should not be undermined; it makes the open nature of the system 
irrefutable. In doubtful situations, an open clause hinders the possibility of denying the 
acceptance of new fundamental content into a specific rights system. 
The welcoming of new fundamental content to the system can happen, depen-
ding on the specificities of the concrete constitutional system concerned, through the 
reception of international law norms, through constitutional amendment and through 
the enactment of new legislative norms. All these phenomena are here understood 
falling under the regulative field of the implicit principle of openness.
It is common that constitutions, besides or not to an explicit broad open clause, 
enshrine specific open clauses towards international law. Many constitutions stipulate 
the reception of international law norms that can convey new rights, norms on inter-
pretation, norms on legal remedies and even norms on rights restrictions62. 
61  MASSEY, Calvin R.. Silent rights: the ninth amendment and the Constitution’s unenumerated rights. Phil-
adelphia: Temple University, 1995; BARNETT, Randy E.. Reconceiving the ninth amendment. 74 Cornell Law 
Review, 1, 1988-1989, p. 1-42; BARNETT, Randy E..Who’s afraid of unenumerated rights. University of Pennsyl-
vania Journal of Constitutional Law, 1, 2006-2007, p. 1-22; DWORKIN, Ronald. Unenumerated Rights: wheth-
er and how Roe should be overruled. The University of Chicago Law Review, 59.1992, p. 381-432.
62  See the example of the Brazilian Constitution: “Art. 5, paragraph 3: International human rights treaties and 
conventions which are approved in each house of the national congress, in two rounds of voting, by three fifths of 
the votes of the respective members shall be equivalent to constitutional amendments.” In the Portuguese Con-
stitution there is this provision: “Art 16. n. 2: The constitutional precepts concerning fundamental rights must be 
interpreted and completed in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
On open clauses in Latin American Constitutions, see BREWER-CARÍAS, Allan. Constitutional protection of hu-
man rights in Latin America. Cambridge, 2009, p. 21 ss; NETTO, Luísa Cristina Pinto e. A abertura do sistema 
de direitos fundamentais do Estado Constitucional. Curitiba: Íthala, 2016.
Maybe the Dutch Constitution should receive special attention. Although much has been written about its open-
ness towards international law, because of its explicit provision on the matter (Article 93: “Provisions of treaties 
and of resolutions by international institutions which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall 
become binding after they have been published.”), a punctual approach in this specific fundamental rights sce-
nario might be particularly interesting.
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Another door for new fundamental content is the traditional process of cons-
titutional amendment, well-known either in rigid or in flexible constitutional models, 
which leads, within their idiosyncrasies, to accommodating new content in the funda-
mental rights system.
The constitutional amendment relates to the norm of openness but requires 
specific attention. The presence of constitutional provisions disciplining constitutio-
nal amendment tries to parameter the tension between the necessity of having basic 
norms settled and the necessity of regularly exercising democratic power to respond 
to historical changes. The implicit principle of openness commands the update of the 
system to face new challenges posed to human dignity. Nonetheless, there are legal 
obstacles to assert an obligation to amend the constitution. The competence or the 
possibility to do so might be disciplined in the system, but its exercise rests upon de-
mocratic will within the constitutional order. 
The fundamental rights system participates in the architecture of the constitu-
tional identity and must, therefore, maintain its core meaning; core provisions repre-
sent substantial limits on constitutional amendment. Notwithstanding, there can be, to 
a certain extent, restrictive constitutional amendments concerning fundamental rights. 
What is important to note is that constitutional amendment is a proper way of updating 
the fundamental rights system and that it happens beyond interpretation, through tex-
tual provision modification.
Considering the general nature of constitutional fundamental rights provisions 
and the various duties they necessarily impose on state, the effectiveness of funda-
mental rights depends for a great extent on state normative and concrete activities. 
Constitutional fundamental rights norms often require further legislative develop-
ment. Ordinary law provisions may carry new fundamental content capable of claiming 
compensatory constitutionalization.
4.4. Openness imposed by international law
In our kaleidoscopic multilevel legal world, the interaction between various le-
gal orders seems unavoidable63. The mutual influence exercised by international law, 
global law and domestic constitutional law (it seems more appropriate to think of cons-
titutional laws in order to emphasize the multitude of legal domestic orders that inte-
ract), has an appealing impact on rights and on the openness of the fundamental rights 
63  The expression kaleidoscopic was borrowed from Edith Brown Weiss (WEISS, Edith Brown. Intergen-
erational Equity in a Kaleidoscopic World, Environmental Policy and Law, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 3-11, 2019. 
<https://content.iospress.com/download/environmental-policy-and-law/epl190115?id=environmental-pol-
icy-and-law%2Fepl190115> accessed 21 January 2020; WEISS, Edith Brown. International Law in a Kaleido-
scopic World (2011). Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. 1622. https://scholarship.law.
georgetown.edu/facpub/1622).
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system. This phenomenon operates either through interpretation as through adding 
new norms to the system; the different ways of openness relate and strengthen each 
other.
It seems important to note, as pointed out by Christina Eckes, when writing on 
human rights protection in the European and international scenario, that human rights 
constitute a special case in the interaction between different legal spheres64.
A first open door in the international law field is the recognition of an Interna-
tional law of human rights65. It is somewhat controversial but still affirmed that some in-
ternational norms on human rights hold jus cogens nature66. The reserved state domain 
suffers an erosion when it comes to rights; beyond the field of autonomous commit-
ments, the set of jus cogens norms amounts, imposing itself heteronomously, and does 
no longer simply fall into states’ sovereign decision terrain.
The absence of international institutions and courts to enforce these norms re-
present relevant theoretical and practical problems to their acceptance. However, this 
does not preclude the possibility and importance of cogitating of International human 
rights law and approaching it as a significant way of openness of the domestic funda-
mental rights systems.
64  Christina Eckes wrote: “Human rights are a special case when it comes to the interaction of different legal 
spheres. I would go as far as claiming that fundamental rights constitute the most difficult area when pondering 
questions of resilience, autonomy and porosity of one legal sphere vis-à-vis another. The following five substantive 
reasons support this position. They also explain why institutionally rights have proven so problematic within the his-
tory of EU integration.” For these five reasons and further development, see ECKES, Christina. Integrated rights 
protection in the European and International Context: some reflections about limits and consequences. In 
GOVAERE, I., GARBEN, S. (Eds.). Interfaces between European and International Law (pp. 101-124). (Modern 
Studies in European Law; Vol. 89). Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019. https://doi.org/10.5040/97815099234100.
65  TRINDADE, Antônio Augusto Cançado. Tratado de direito internacional dos direitos humanos. v. I. Porto 
Alegre: Sergio Antonio Fabris, 1999; KÄLIN, Walter; KÜNZLI, Jörg. The law of international human rights pro-
tection. Oxford: Oxford, 2009.
66  Discussing this problematic from different perspectives, see, among others, CRIDDLE, Evan; FOX-DECENT, 
Evan. Fiduciaries of humanity: how international law constitutes authority. Oxford scholarship online. 2016 ( 
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199397921.001.0001); TASIOULAS, John. Custom, jus cogens, and human rights. 
In: BRADLEY, Curtis A. ed. Custom’s future: international law in a changing world. Cambridge University Press, 
Forthcoming, < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2581763&download=yes> acessed 21 
January 2020;  PETERS, Anne. ‘Compensatory constitutionalism: the function and potential of fundamental 
international norms and structures ’, 19 Leiden journal of international law (2006);  BIANCHI, Andrea. Human 
rights and the magic of jus cogens. The European Journal of International Law,  Vol. 19 no. 3 © EJIL 2008; 
PARKER, Karen. Jus Cogens: compelling the law of human rights. Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev, v. 12, n. 2, p. 
411-463, 1989.; DE WET, Erika. The emergence of international and regional value systems as a manifestation of 
the emerging international constitutional order. Leiden Journal of International Law, 2006, n. 19, p. 611–632; 
DE WET, Erika. The emerging international constitutional order: the implications of hierarchy in international 
law for the coherence and legitimacy of international decision-making. PER/PLJ, 2007, v. 10, n. 2, p. 21-46; DE 
WET, Erika. The international constitutional order. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2006, jan., 
v. 55, p. 51-76; DE WET, Erika. The prohibition of torture as an international norm of jus cogens and its impli-
cations for national and costumary law. European Journal of International Law, 2004, v. 15, n. 1, p. 97-121; 
BAPTISTA, Eduardo Correia. Ius cogens em direito internacional. Lisboa: Lex, 1997. 
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Besides this heteronomous content which imposes itself to states, international 
law conveys substantial new fundamental content to the fundamental rights system 
through self-commitment of states. Many constitutions, as mentioned above, discipline 
the integration of international norms within the domestic legal order, which would 
fall within the traditional international public law. States commit themselves through 
international law binding instruments which bring new content into their domestic ri-
ghts systems.
Furthermore, the emergence of a global legal order and global or transnatio-
nal constitutionalism also comes into play; there is an attempt to construct a global 
law which goes beyond the traditional public international law67. Many scholars wri-
te about constitutionalism beyond the state; in these discussions, human rights take 
an important position as they are crucial in any constitutionalizing movement of the 
global space. Despite all difficulties faced by such a construction, it seems possible to 
speak of an emerging global values system: a set of principles and moral norms vehicu-
lated by legal means in which human dignity, human rights and fair procedures stand 
in the very centre. In such a scenario, states do not lose their role towards rights, but 
state sovereignty claims are revisited68.
On the one hand, the legal interactions here addressed can lead to new content 
being integrated into the fundamental rights system of a constitutional state as new 
norms. On the other hand, interpretative operations based on these interactions are 
no less capable of fertilizing the system. It is important to highlight that the influence 
is mutual; international law influences domestic law but is in its turn also significantly 
enriched by national jurisdictions and legal contributions.
67  PETERS, Anne. Membership in the global constitutional community. In: KLABBERS, Jan; PETERS, Anne; ULF-
STEIN, Geir. The constitutionalization of international law. Oxford: oxford, 2009, p. 153-262. With different 
points of view on these matters, see: CASSESE, Sabino. La globalización jurídica. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006; 
TEUBER, Gunther. Fragmented foundations: societal constitutionalism beyond the national state. In: DOBNER, 
Petra; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The twilight of constitutionalism? Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 327-341; DOBNER, Pe-
tra. More law, less democracy?: democracy and transnational constitutionalism. In: DOBNER, Petra; LOUGHLIN, 
Martin. The twilight of constitutionalism? Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 141-161; TEUBNER, Gunther. Constitu-
tional fragments: societal constitutionalism and globalization. Oxford: Oxford, 2012; LOUGHLIN, Martin. What 
is constitutionalisation? In: DOBNER, Petra; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The twilight of constitutionalism? Oxford: 
Oxford, 2012, p. 47-69; KUMM, Mattias. The legitimacy of international law: a constitutionalist framework of 
analysis. The European Journal of International law, 2004, v. 15, n. 5, p. 907-931; GRIMM, Dieter. The achieve-
ment of constitutionalism and its prospects in a changed world. In: DOBNER, Petra; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The 
twilight of constitutionalism? Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 3-22; KUMM, Mattias. The best of times and the worst 
of times: between constitutional triumphalism and nostalgia. In: DOBNER, Petra; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The twi-
light of constitutionalism? Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 201-219; KRISCH, Nico. Global administrative law and the 
constitutional ambition. In: DOBNER, Petra; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The twilight of constitutionalism? Oxford: 
Oxford, 2012, p. 245-266. KRISCH, Nico. Beyond constitutionalism: the pluralist structure of postnational law. 
Oxford: Oxford, 2010.
68  PETERS, Anne. Humanity as the A and Ω of sovereignty. The European Journal of International Law, 
2009, v. 20, n. 3, p. 513-544.
LUÍSA NETTO
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 11-75, jan./abr. 2021.34 
At this point, the open nature of the fundamental rights system of the constitu-
tional state as a general theoretical conception has been presented in its core ideas. It is 
guided by the goal of providing human dignity with updated and adequate protection 
and means to self-development. Openness is unavoidable. Nonetheless, openness as 
stated, claims for boundaries, which will be addressed in the following section.
5. OPENNESS AND CLOSURE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SYS-
TEM – CRITERIA FOR APPROACHING SUBSTANTIAL FUNDA-
MENTALITY
The argumentation developed so far focused on the systematic organization of 
fundamental rights in domestic constitutions and on the inherent open nature of the-
se rights systems. The central idea is that the grounding legal norm of human dignity 
claims updated protection and promotion to face evolving challenges and threats. This 
underlying assumption reinforces the importance of fundamental rights and, conse-
quently, all the theoretical construction aims to strengthen its concept, enforceability, 
and effectiveness.
In this context, respecting these very central premises, the acknowledgement 
that fundamental rights are powerful legal means to protect and promote human dig-
nity is crucial. Nonetheless, it does not follow that an endless expansion of rights leads 
to a better protection for human dignity. An artificial proliferation of rights can have 
deleterious effects on the domestic separation of powers, on the capacity of states to 
guarantee rights, on the normative force of rights. 
To face an alleged rights overreach and its consequences and guarantee the 
role of rights as effective legal means implying feasible obligations, it is vital to offer 
theoretical foundations and boundaries to the conception of an open rights system. 
The goal is to prevent the denaturation and weakening of the concept of human and 
fundamental rights69.
69  The construction advanced above focused on the fundamental rights system; it offered a theoretical and 
general approach to rights systems enshrined in domestic constitutions. Some core ideas can be translated 
beyond the state as soon as the necessary adaptations to address a general human rights system are made. 
Specially the idea of interpretative openness seems adequate and useful. It does not appear impossible, how-
ever, to also cogitate of openness to new content on human rights considering the broader panorama of inter-
national law sources. In addition, one can think of openness as a consequence of the interaction with domestic 
legal orders. Anyway, the particularities of international law must not be neglected and lead to the necessity 
of further specific development on the openness of the human rights system. There is no such instrument as a 
global constitution, no such courts. Besides, the legal order beyond the state is fragmentated and populated 
by a series of various actors. These clarifications having been made, it is relevant to assign that the phenome-
non of an alleged rights overreach can be regarded either domestically either internationally and in this aspect 
it seems that a joint approach is possible. The argumentation hereafter will focus mainly in the domestic arena, 
but can be again translated, mutatis mutandis, to the global arena.
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Therefore, this paper proposes to take a further step. Beyond asserting the open 
character of the fundamental rights system, it also aims to explore the consequences 
of this openness upon the constitutional system and upon the rights system itself. He-
reafter, an attempt to strike an adequate balance between openness and closure of the 
rights system is made70.
5.1 Consequences of the openness 
The assumption that the fundamental rights system of the constitutional state 
holds an open nature forcibly delivers substantial consequences for the broader legal 
system of this state. The first pillar of this state model where these consequences appe-
ar is the separation of powers; openness implies an active role of the judiciary, espe-
cially of constitutional courts.
The conception of structural openness and the multitude of norms with a natu-
re of principles, namely the fundamental rights, have a clear impact on the interpreta-
tion field. The judiciary is called to give the last word on interpretation, bringing to light 
the implicit rights, the unenumerated rights, the various subjective positions included 
in a fundamental right positivized as a principle. In this process the judiciary should 
present and justify implicit, derivative norms. This circumstance enhances the judicial 
control competences concerning legislative activity71. The judiciary cannot flee from 
this task but cannot, on the other hand, trespass its boundaries and become legislator. 
This would represent a disequilibrium in the division of functions and could also create 
burdens to executive action without direct democratic foundation. 
Apart from the questions which arise from the importance given to interpre-
tation, it seems undeniable that “new” rights always impose new burdens on all sta-
te powers. One often thinks of the classical social rights, which more clearly demand 
positive state action. Nonetheless, one should also consider some very actual “broad” 
rights, such as, for example, the alleged right to development72. Stephan Schill calls 
70  Hurst Hannun writes: “Attempting to regulate ever more narrow slices of life under ever more diverse circum-
stances through promoting new human rights runs a serious risk of undermining both the legitimacy of human 
rights and their universality. The result may be to simply expand the number of rights that are routinely ignored 
rather than to bring real help to those whose rights, no matter how narrowly construed, are already being violated.” 
(HANNUM, Hurst. Rescuing human rights: a radically moderate approach. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2019, p. 79)
71  For an interesting discussion departing from a concrete case, see: BURGERS, Laura; STAAL, Tim Climate ac-
tion as positive human rights obligation: the appeals judgment in Urgenda v the Netherlands. In WESSEL, Ram-
ses A; WERNER, Wouter; BOUTIN, Bérénice (Eds.) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2018, T.M.C. 
Asser Press, forthcoming in spring 2019. Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series 
No. 2019-01.
See also, KUMM, Mattias. Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights and the problem of judicial review. In: KLATT, 
Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 201-217.
72  For an interesting approach on the right to development, see BALDE, Aua. O direito ao desenvolvimento 
como um direito fundamental. In: African human rights yearbook. V 3. Pretoria: Pretoria University Press, 
2019, p. 49-71. 
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the attention that such a right demands governance structures because “successful de-
velopment depends on functionIng political and economic structures”73. Yvonne Donders 
also makes the broad spectrum of this right evident, when explaining its meaning and 
content; the right to development entails that “people are entitled to participate In, con-
tribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural, political development In which all human 
rights can be fully realized”74. Considering that fundamental or human rights impose 
significant burdens on states, it is not feasible to envisage an always escalating bundle 
of new rights and disregard states obligations, budget, organization and procedures75.
Other consequences of the openness also challenge the constitutional system. 
The openness of the rights system culminates in operating a compensatory constitu-
tionalization of rights not enshrined in constitutional provisions, either not explicitly 
formulated but capable of being arguably implicit or new rights conveyed by ordinary 
law or international law provisions. Ordinary norms or international norms that esta-
blish rights are lifted to a constitutional level, are constitutionalized. The assumption 
that these rights (especially the ones established by ordinary law provisions), which 
are not formally constitutional, participate in the substantive constitution presents the 
peril of subverting the normative hierarchy and depleting the superiority of constitu-
tional norms.
This is not the opportunity to deepen and discuss in detail all possible conse-
quences of the openness of the fundamental rights system for the constitutional sys-
tem. It is important to acknowledge them in an attempt to draft a broad scenario, but 
the focus in this paper must lay on the rights system itself.
Within a wider possible range of consequences of openness for the fundamen-
tal rights system itself, the following must be highlighted: necessity of defining the le-
gal protection regime of the rights; danger of uncontrolled enhancing of the so-called 
fundamental rights weakening their significance and importance; increased risk of con-
flict between rights; necessity of protection against backsliding; necessity of criteria for 
assessing the substantial fundamentality of “new” rights. 
73  SCHILL, Stephan; TAMS, Christian J., HOFMANN, Rainer. International investment law and develop-
ment: friends or foes? (2015). In SCHILL, Stephan; TAMS, Christian J., HOFMANN, Rainer (eds.). Internation-
al investment law and development: bridging the gap (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) 3-42. 
DOI: 10.4337/9781784711351.00008, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2017-26, Amsterdam Center 
for International Law No. 2017-22, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2934251.
74  DONDERS, Yvonne; LAAKSONEN, Annamari. Finding Ways to Measure the Cultural Dimension of Human 
Rights and Development (November 9, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1657837 or http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1657837
75  In my professional experience as state attorney for the state of Minas Gerais in Brazil, I have experienced 
this aspect in the everyday practical legal activity. In Brazil, under the Constitution of 1988, an ever-growing 
number of lawsuits against states and federal government has taken place, with various demands on rights 
enforcement, especially in the field of the right to health. In this scenario, the judiciary becomes central, fre-
quently determining that the government (the executive branch) must provide remedies and medical treat-
ment with substantive consequences on public health policies and on public budget and expenditure. 
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A specific question concerning the compensatory constitutionalization of rights 
is their regime; which should be the legal regime of new, unwritten, or implicit rights? 
The first idea is that the regime of compensatory constitutionalized rights ought to be 
the same as the formal constitutional rights. Due to their substantial content, these 
“new” rights ought to be granted constitutional status, ought to receive the legal pro-
tection aimed at the formally enshrined rights. The underlying reason to constitutiona-
lize rights is to guarantee them the protection offered by the warranting elements of 
the rights system.
The risk of weakening the constitutional normativity mentioned above appears 
as a specific risk of weakening the fundamental rights legal force. A hyperbolized “cre-
ation” or acceptance of new fundamental rights could unfold into a rights overreach 
or artificial proliferation. Openness could become a process of “panjusfundamentaliza-
tion”, i.e., regarding every possible human claim or every state duty or obligation as a 
fundamental right. Since the state cannot cope with the burden brought by all these al-
leged fundamental rights, their effectiveness is in danger as well as the enforcement of 
the constitution. To turn the eyes again towards state powers, an overreaching compen-
satory constitutionalization of rights can lead to weakening constitutional normativity.
It seems relevant to approach “panjusfundamentalization” because it may emp-
ty the significance of fundamental rights and lead to deleterious effects on fundamen-
tal rights and on the constitutional system itself.  It is possible to speculate of a “pan-
jusfundamentalization” phenomenon (i) regarding the holder/titularity of the rights 
– artificial broadening of the conception of the right holder, advocating rights for legal 
persons, for animals, for the environment; (ii) regarding the protected good or content 
of the rights – subjectivizing contents that have an objective nature or a meta-indivi-
dual common good, e.g., a right to legality, a right to environment, a right to a good 
administration, a right to a corruption-free administration, a right to transparency76; 
(iii) regarding rights addressees – rights addressing not only state powers, but private 
actors and individuals. 
It is important to notice that asserting or questioning if some content should 
receive legal protection under the framework of fundamental or human rights and 
answering that it should not, does not mean these goods or values do not deserve 
legal protection. It means that another juridical framework might be more suitable. 
One example may clarify the issue. It is common to assume a rights-based approach 
to corruption in developing or underdeveloped countries, relating rights insufficient 
76  With a similar approach see: “The first is substantive overreach. This relates to what we take to be human 
rights. There is a persistent tendency to present more and more political demands as human rights, but on 
very dubious grounds.” (TASIOULAS, John. Are human rights taking over the space once occupied by politics? 
Newstatesmen (26, August, 2019). (<https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/08/are-human-rights-taking-
over-space-once-occupied-politics> accessed 07.02.2020).
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enforcement with corruption and regarding corruption as a violation against rights; a 
right to a good and probe administration is often called upon77. This exemplifies “pan-
jusfundamentalization” or the now so-called rights overreach. There might be a more 
suitable legal framework to fight against corruption than labelling it within the rights 
discourse78.
Because fundamental and human rights stand central in the legal orders (do-
mestic and beyond the state) and touch axial issues that regard state, community, and 
the individual, they intertwine with almost every pungent political decision. A tenden-
cy to draw on rights framework to address these decisions and try to solve political, 
economic and social acute problems is understandable. Rights have been standing 
more and more in the centre of legal and political discussions after the Second World 
War. It is appealing to think that rights will offer the answer to climate and environment 
problems, that they will eventually help us through the dilemmas brought about by 
technology and science in a world still marked by enormous inequalities and undiag-
nosed risks. Nonetheless, rights legal framework might not be capable neither suitab-
le for these challenges; some issues demand different approaches in the political and 
economic arena79.
These considerations point to a steady defence of fundamental and human ri-
ghts, but at the same time, to a prudent and conscious approach, not disregarding the 
necessity of caution towards a “panjusfundamentalization” or overreach phenomenon. 
The peril of not recalibrating the scope of rights discourse and legal practice, in order 
to strengthen their concept and normative force, might be, in reverse, strengthening 
scepticism and populist onslaughts against these very rights80.
From another perspective, light must be shed on the fact that rights also have 
an impact in private relations and that an artificial proliferation of rights can have as a 
 
77  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union establishes a “right to good administration” in 
its article 41. For an interesting approach, see PETERS, Anne. Corruption as a Violation of International Human 
Rights, European Journal of International Law, vol. 29, n. 4, p. 1251-1287, nov. 2018.
78  PETERS, Anne. Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights, European Journal of Internation-
al Law, vol. 29, n. 4, p. 1251-1287, nov. 2018.
79  For an interesting approach on these issues, see HANNUM, Hurst.  Rescuing human rights: a radically 
moderate approach. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019; TASIOULAS, John. Are human rights taking 
over the space once occupied by politics? Newstatesmen (26, August, 2019). (<https://www.newstatesman.
com/2019/08/are-human-rights-taking-over-space-once-occupied-politics> accessed 07.02.2020).
80  In this regard: “Often, growing scepticism about human rights is interpreted as a ‘populist backlash’. Recall the 
threat by then US presidential candidate Donald Trump to bring back ‘a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding’ 
for suspected terrorists, or Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s dismissal of human rights as ‘manure for rascals’ – 
‘rascals’ designating indigenous people, the criminally accused, and members of the LBGTQ community.” (TASIOU-
LAS, John. Are human rights taking over the space once occupied by politics? Newstatesmen (26, August, 
2019). (<https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/08/are-human-rights-taking-over-space-once-occupied-poli-
tics> accessed 07.02.2020).
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side effect a compression in freedom, delivering an opposite legal effect than expected. 
The horizontal efficacy of fundamental rights is of great importance but requires cau-
tion to identify the power relations suited for its application. 
Besides that, in the fundamental rights field conflict is not an unexpected pro-
blem that demands a definitive solution, it is a constant challenge which claims to be 
permanently managed. Conflicts between fundamental rights and between funda-
mental rights and other constitutionally positivized values or goals are inherent and 
unavoidable. Even though this is a well-accepted aspect81, a rights proliferation might 
flow into an overarching multitude of conflicts with a negative effect on rights. 
At this point, it is relevant to notice that the affirmation of the open character 
of the fundamental rights system implicates its mobility not only to expand its con-
tent but also to evolve through restrictive changes concerning specific rights. These 
restrictions can derive from new interactions between rights and between rights and 
norms that protect other constitutionalized values and goals. New rights might ask for 
abstract restriction upon existing rights; past and present expansive changes may lead 
to the future need of restrictive changes in the system. The resistance capacity of rights 
comes into play: is it possible to speculate about a prohibition of regression or backsli-
ding of rights protection?
In recent years it became popular in the field of fundamental rights, especially 
social rights, to discuss the possibility of backsliding, of regression of rights legislative 
concretization and implementation. Scholarly relevant material appeared in some con-
texts defending the idea that once rights had been granted some level of normative 
concretization assuring their effectiveness, it would become forbidden to eliminate this 
legislative concretization. This prohibition has been built into an implicit constitutional 
principle, which, despite being controversial, can be reasonably justified and normati-
vely anchored82. In fact, the very normative force of fundamental rights norms as cons-
titutional provisions can ground their resistance ability against the pure elimination of 
legislative norms necessary to assure their effectiveness. 
Considering that most of the thinkable updating modifications in the system 
are expansive ones and that conflicts involving rights and other constitutional goals are 
unavoidable, an absolute prohibition of regression is not feasible. Nonetheless, regres- 
 
81  DONDERS, Yvonne. Towards a right to cultural identity?. Cambridge: Intersentia, 2002; DONDERS, 
Yvonne. Cultural Rights in International Human Rights Law: From Controversy to Celebration (June 26, 2020). 
published in: Japanese Yearbook of International Law (“Cultural Rights in International Human Rights Law: 
From Controversy to Celebration”, Japanese Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 62 (2019) International Law 
Association of Japan (February 2020), pp. 61-84.), Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2020-35, Amster-
dam Center for International Law No. 2020-13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3635993. 
82  NETTO, Luísa Cristina Pinto e. O princípio de proibição de retrocesso social. Porto Alegre: Livraria do 
Advogado, 2010.
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sive measures must undergo strict control in order to be constitutional and adequate 
to the fundamental rights system. A heavy argumentative burden weighs on regressi-
ve changes. Firstly, it is essential to distinguish between concrete restrictive measures 
on fundamental rights when in conflict situations and abstract restrictive normative 
modifications on the constitutional or legislative level. The former indicates a concre-
te conflict in a one case ruling. The latter means precluding norms from the system. 
The restrictions approached here and limited by a prohibition of regression are res-
trictions on the abstract level, i.e., restrictions that mean stepping back on the concre-
tization and effectiveness of rights by suppressing fundamental normative content of 
the legal system. These abstract restrictions must be proportionate and constitutionally 
acceptable83.
Despite the seriousness of the questions and normative problems briefly pre-
sented as consequences of the openness, they ought to coexist with the assumption 
– made in this paper – that the enumerated rights as a static and immobile set of rights 
are not enough to offer the legal protection and promotion required by human dignity. 
This conclusion is followed by the idea that the system should not be closed and static; 
it is inherently open and dynamic. Openness is, at the same time, a necessity concer-
ning the protection required by human dignity and an inevitable consequence of the 
open texture of law. Openness is unwavering; nonetheless, the problems pointed claim 
to be managed, the system cannot expand limitless neither can it expand at the cost 
of its elements or at the cost of the constitutional normativity. Openness must coexist 
with some closure in order to preserve the system identity and to face the problems 
briefly presented.
Conceiving openness as an implicit principle provides relevant theoretical tools 
to face its own limits. Principles, as optimization commands, can collide with each other 
and demand a normative solution in which one principle overweighs other(s) without 
expunging the colliding principle(s) from the system. Departing from the application 
of the principle of openness, the critical aspect of advancing the conditions in which 
new rights should be accepted into the rights system rests on disclosing their substan-
tial fundamentality. The other way round, the presence of substantial fundamentality 
identifies the conditions of application of the principle of openness; it unlocks the door 
to compensatory constitutionalization. Adequate criteria are required to reveal subs-
tantial fundamentality.
83  NETTO, Luísa Cristina Pinto e. O princípio de proibição de retrocesso social. Porto Alegre: Livraria do 
Advogado, 2010.
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5.2 Criteria for testing new rights
The criteria presented below were built upon the idea that openness translates 
the dynamicity of the rights system to evolve offering the protection claimed by human 
dignity and enhancing the normative strength of both the constitutional and the fun-
damental rights systems.
The criteria were construed as an attempt to strike an adequate balance betwe-
en openness and closure of the system, revealing the conditions in which the principle 
of openness must be applied. As the principle of openness is no absolute, but coexists 
with other norms of the system, the criteria consider other normative elements that can 
collide with this principle. Not every advantage position or new subjective claim is able 
to trigger the application of the principle of openness trumping colliding norms, there 
must be substantial fundamentality. The fundamentality test, parametrized by the cri-
teria, converges to the analysis of the possible normative conflicts which involve the 
principle of openness. This analysis aims to identify the conditions in which openness is 
the overweighing norm and must be applied.
To start the testing process, it is essential to draft a concept of fundamental right 
to which the candidate trying to enter the system must be confronted. The structure of 
the candidate must undergo this preliminary analysis. If the structure of the candidate 
copes with the constitutionally adequate definition of fundamental right, it should be 
analyzed to determine whether it is fundamental. Nonetheless, it is important to leave 
some room to the conception of fundamental right to evolve. A present acceptable 
concept was advanced above84.
As a threefold openness was presented, it seems important to note that the cri-
teria to be explored do not aim with the same intensity at all forms of openness. The 
openness that operates through the nature of law, which has to do with legal inter-
pretation and construing argumentation to support derivative fundamental norms, is 
not the first goal of the criteria. In this case, the legal argumentation is directed upon 
defending that a norm should be recognized as a derivative norm, i.e., as an implicit 
norm anchored in one or more explicit provisions which already make part of the sys-
tem. This argumentation is precisely grounded on the idea that this norm is implicit, it 
holds formal fundamentality. Because it is implicit or derivative, it already presents a 
normative foundation. It is certainly important to follow an argumentation process and 
to highlight the substantial fundamentality, to affirm how fundamental the content de-
fended is and how it is linked to other norms directly deduced from explicit provisions. 
Nonetheless, the substantial fundamentality, in this scenario, is still coupled with the 
formal fundamentality.
84  Specifically considered, fundamental rights are legal subjective advantage positions linked (in distinct in-
tensity) to human dignity. Fundamental rights are positivized in a state legal order, preferably in its constitu-
tion, as legal norms with subjective and objective content, safeguarded against and through state powers.
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The main idea behind the criteria is to unveil the substantial fundamentality of 
rights and, departing from the assertion that this fundamentality exists, claim to treat 
these rights the same way as the ones which hold formal fundamentality are treated. 
This circumstance explains why the criteria are more suitable to test “new” rights, rights 
which do not profit from sufficient argumentation to be presented as already implicit 
in the system.
The pursuit of criteria to substantially test new candidates to enrich the funda-
mental rights system lays in the very foundations of fundamental rights and must be a 
combination of formal and substantial elements. There should be a procedure to check 
both source and content of rights. Nonetheless, a positive result of such a checking pro-
cess must not be understood as an affirmation of the definitive validity or application of 
a fundamental right norm in a concrete case. Instead, the identification of substantial 
fundamentality leads to introducing the right in the fundamental rights system as a 
prima facie norm. Its application in a specific case must be verified in the very concrete 
case considering the other possibly applicable norms, as it happens to every norm in 
the system.
Concerning formal aspects, a first important observation is that openness as a 
principle is not itself a source of new rights, these must stem from some legitimate 
source of law to profit from the openness and enter the system. Rights and subjecti-
ve positions may result from judicial activity which confers them broader or renewed 
significates through interpretation85. As for sources in strictly technical meaning, rights 
may be stipulated by constitutional amendment, by legislative enactment of new in-
fraconstitutional law and by international law instruments. Openness does not create 
new rights. Rights established by legitimate sources may be welcomed in the system 
through its openness.
The sources mentioned, except from constitutional amendment and to some 
extent international law instruments (according to constitutional provisions), are not 
legitimate to “create” “new” rights granting them the status of formal constitutional 
norms. This is the reason these rights must undergo a test to verify their substantial 
fundamentality in order to claim compensatory constitutionalization. They are not 
born as constitutional norms; if they carry substantial fundamentality, they ought to 
be constitutionalized. 
Even when constitutions enshrine explicit open clauses, these clauses do not 
provide criteria for a definitive identification of substantial fundamentality of rights. 
 
85  PULIDO, Carlos Bernal. La fuerza vinculante de la jurisprudencia en el orden jurídico colombiano. In: CAVI-
NO, Massimo (a cura di). Esperienze di diritto vivente: la giurisprudenza negli ordinamenti di diritto legislati-
vo: Italia, Francia, Belgio, Germania, Spagna, Portogallo, Brasile, Argentina, Colombia. Milano: Giuffrè, 2009. v.1, 
p. 279-312.
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Sometimes there is some indication but, even then, there must be further theoretical 
and judicial elaboration. An example can illustrate what has been said. The Brazilian 
open clause establishes (art. 5, paragraph 2. of Brazilian Constitution): “The rights and 
guarantees expressed In this Constitution do not exclude others derivIng from the regime 
and from the prInciples adopted by it, or from the International treaties In which the Fede-
rative Republic of Brazil is a party.” When a right is established in a treaty, it can be easily 
identified as the source is explicitly indicated by the constitutional open clause. Still, 
further elaboration might be needed, because not every right in every international law 
provision carries the status of fundamental or human right. For the rights that derive 
from the regime and the principles adopted by the Brazilian constitution, it becomes 
evident that further inquiry and elaboration are required. The constitution does not 
point out by which sources these rights can be positivized (ordinary law? Judicial de-
cisions with erga omnes effects in constitutional review – a precedent?). The substan-
tial parameters, on their turn, are far from leading to objective or predictable answers; 
which fundamental content falls under derivIng from the regime and from the prInciples 
adopted by the Constitution?86 This example shows that the presence of an explicit open 
clause does not preclude the necessity of presenting criteria to select the rights able to 
benefit from the openness provided by the very clause.
The same reasoning holds in the face of specific open clauses towards interna-
tional law instruments. In the presence of provisions carrying rights, it might be neces-
sary to question either they are “new” rights to the system, rights already present in the 
system but with different levels of protection or legal regimes, or even if they are rights 
with a human or fundamental right nature. International norms may also establish state 
obligations from which it might be possible to derive subjective advantage positions 
claiming to have their substantial fundamentality tested. In these cases, while the le-
gal source question might not be an issue, the normative content remains subject to 
questioning87.
To what concerns the substantial criteria to find substantial fundamentality it 
is important to note that it did not seem adequate to seek these criteria in “natural 
law” because it is necessary to provide an intersubjective rationally controllable foun-
dation for these pretense fundamental rights. The democratic state legal order should 
not require meta-social guarantees, and law should not be construed as image and 
 
86  Some similar reasoning can be conducted in the face of the North American constitutional system, since 
the IX Amendment establishes: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
87  Once more the Brazilian provision may help to illustrate the situation: “International human rights treaties 
and conventions which are approved in each house of the national congress, in two rounds of voting, by three fifths 
of the votes of the respective members shall be equivalent to constitutional amendments.” (Article 5 paragraph 3 of 
the Brazilian Constitution)
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likeness of a natural or metaphysical legal order based on moral pre-state suprapositive 
principles. As stated by Jürgen Habermas, law ought to be construed upon principles 
which can be rationally justified88.
Having clarified these premises about the testing criteria, it is important to bring 
to light the most important theoretical contributions used in their development. A signi-
ficant input to the founding of new rights was sought in Ronald Dworkin’s construction 
on principles, on the force of rights, on law’s integrity, on the hermeneutic enterprise89. 
In addition, the consensual truth theory of Jürgen Habermas was a particularly valuable 
tool to reach a consensus on values through communicative rational action and discou-
rse90. Besides, as already signaled, the philosophical construction of Robert Alexy has a 
central role in the whole conception of the system of rights and its openness. This cons-
truction provides for foundations to think beyond a mere positivist approach, emphasi-
zing the necessary connection between law and morality, without allowing morality to 
colonize law entirely. The latter also enabled to work within a procedural model of rules 
and principles, to be operated through legal argumentation91. It is evident that these 
theoretical foundations present, apart from some convergent points, many divergent 
elements, which require caution to avoid absolute incompatibilities. 
Every constitutional system has its own characteristics, but it is possible to ad-
dress a certain level of generalization, as pointed above. Departing from this gene-
ralization, the criteria are presented in abstract terms and should be adapted when 
applied to specific constitutional systems.
The criteria were construed upon the constitutional definition of fundamental 
rights and its core elements, seeking to provide an adequate balance between open-
ness and closure of the fundamental rights system of the constitutional state. These are 
the guiding ideas to approach the criteria to test new rights:
• there is no standalone criterion;
• formal or structural criteria are not sufficient;
• the criteria presented should not be seen as absolute of immutable 
parameters.
88  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012; ALEXY, Robert. The argument from injustice: a reply to legal positivism. Oxford: Oxford, 2002.
89  DWORKIN, Ronald. Taking rights seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978; DWORKIN, Ronald. 
O império do direito. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1999; DWORKIN, Ronald. Uma questão de princípio. São 
Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000.
90  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The theory of communicative action. V. 1. Boston: Beacon. 1985; MACCARTHY, 
Thomas. La teoría crítica de Jürgen Habermas. Madrid: Tecnos, 1987; LAFONT, Cristina. Correctness and le-
gitimacy in the discourse theory of law. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence 
of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 291-306.
91  ALEXY, Robert. A theory of legal argumentation: the theory of rational discourse as theory of legal justi-
fication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
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Departing from these guidelines, the criteria to test the substantial fundamen-
tality of a new right are the following:
• its relevance to the norm of human dignity;
• the individual as its reference;
• its relevance to and its connection with the fundamental rights norms expli-
citly positivized in the constitution;
• its relevance to and its connection with the structuring elements of the fun-
damental rights system;
• its relevance to and its connection with the structuring principles of the 
constitutional state;
• its closeness to the international standards on human rights;
• its justifiability (the ability of being properly justified);
• the suitability of its source.
It seems important to explore these criteria, explaining what is understood un-
der each of them and how they should parametrize the test of new rights.
5.2.1 Relevance to the norm of human dignity 
The fundamental rights, which take part in the system, should serve “the direct 
protection and guarantee of legal goods withIn the personal sphere which are Indispensa-
ble to the safeguard of every person’s human dignity…”92.
Hence, rights which have no formal status as constitutional norms, in order to 
enter the fundamental rights system through the fundamentality test, must likewise 
serve the protection of legal goods within the individual sphere which are indispensa-
ble to safeguarding human dignity. In the testing process, the argumentation burden 
ought to be adequately fulfilled showing that the new right is required by or enhances 
the protection and the promotion of human dignity. It should become visible that hu-
man dignity would lack important protection if the right would not be accepted in the 
system. 
The idea is to raise human dignity as a parameter, as Jürgen Habermas points 
out when dealing with a constitution for Europe. Dignity is a “seismograph that Indicates 
what is constitutive for democratic order – which are precisely the rights that are granted to 
citizens of a political community and, therefore, they may consider each other as members 
92  CORREIA, José Manuel Sérvulo. Direitos fundamentais: sumários. Lisboa: Associação Académica da Facul-
dade de Direito de Lisboa, 2002, p. 55. The piece was freely translated from the Portuguese original.
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of a voluntary association of free and equal”93. Habermas refers to a conceptual liaison 
between human dignity and human rights; dignity is the moral source of rights94.
Human dignity is the core element to approach a substantial concept of funda-
mental and human rights. The election of human dignity as the paramount parameter 
to fundamental rights does not seem controversial; this idea can be soundly held in 
the field of rights, fundamental or human95. On the opposite, taming human dignity 
to fit into a concept or a definition is deeply controversial, especially considering the 
theoretical foundations of this paper, which defend that an official definition of human 
dignity must be avoided96.
Reasonable moral disagreement is possible in regard to human dignity and fun-
damental or human rights questions. The recognition of new rights – which are situa-
ted midst such disagreements – ought to be guided by the idea of guarantying in the 
broadest way possible the coexistence of diverse moral conceptions. This coexistence 
should give room to individual autonomy to inclusively define his or her own dignity. 
This seems to be the best acceptable approach to human dignity in our kaleidoscopic 
world, especially considering the democratic element of the constitutional state and 
the unavoidable moral plurality of society97.
93  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights. Metaphilos-
ophy, vol. 41, no. 4, 2010, pp. 464–480. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24439631. Accessed 4 Jan. 2021, p. 464-
480. With a critical approach to Habermas’ construction see WALKER, Neil. Habermas’s European constitution: 
catalyst, reconstruction, refounding. (https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12341). Also see MCCRUDDEN, Christopher. 
Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights. European Journal of International Law. http//ssrn.
com/abstract=1162024, accessed 06.01.2014; BARROSO, Luís Roberto. A dignidade da pessoa humana no di-
reito constitucional contemporâneo: a construção de um conceito jurídico à luz da jurisprudência mundial. 
Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2012.
94  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights. Metaphiloso-
phy, vol. 41, no. 4, 2010, pp. 464–480. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24439631. Accessed 4 Jan. 2021, p. 464-480.
95  ECKES, Christina. Integrated rights protection in the European and International Context: some reflections 
about limits and consequences. In GOVAERE, I., GARBEN, S. (Eds.). Interfaces between European and Interna-
tional Law (pp. 101-124). (Modern Studies in European Law; Vol. 89). Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019. https://doi.
org/10.5040/9781509923410.
96  In order to think how controversial the legally protected concept of human dignity might get it is eluci-
dative to think about questions concerning abortion, euthanasia, drug use, genetic manipulation, new family 
models, to quote only a few. See HABERMAS, Jürgen. The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia 
of human rights. Metaphilosophy, vol. 41, no. 4, 2010, pp. 464–480. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24439631. 
Accessed 4 Jan. 2021, p. 464-480; FARBER, Daniel A.. Retained by the people: the “silent” ninth amendment 
and the constitutional rights Americans don’t know they have. New York: Basic Books, 2007, p. 115 ss; SIEGEL, 
Reva B.. Dignity and the politics of protection: abortion restrictions under Casey/Carhart. Faculty Scholarship 
Series. 2008. Paper 1134. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1134.  
97  Justice Cançado Trindade points out to the need of crosscultural foundations to human dignity (TRIN-
DADE, Antônio Augusto Cançado. Tratado de direito internacional dos direitos humanos. v. I. Porto Alegre: 
Sergio Antonio Fabris, 1999). See also PIOVESAN, Flávia. Igualdade, diferença e direitos humanos. Rio de 
Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2010, p. 3-45; WESTON, Burns H.. The universality of human rights in a multicultured 
world: toward respectful decision-making. In WESTON, Burns H.; MARKS, Stephen P. (eds.). The future of inter-
national human rights. New York: Transnational. 1999, p. 65-99.
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One example, controversial as it may seem, illustrates the idea briefly exposed. 
The recognition of a right to same-sex marriage or union or its acceptance as a legal 
institution can be in the middle of harsh moral disagreements and may lead to disputes 
between diverse moral conceptions. Nonetheless, the recognition of such a legal right 
brings to light that the state is not embracing a particular moral conception as part of 
an official morality. The recognition of such a right, on the contrary, exposes the enlar-
gement of the space of protected freedom within the boundaries of the legal system. 
It enables the concretization of an important aspect of human dignity by the ones who 
exercise this freedom and autonomously make a choice concerning their affections and 
unions. The right grants them adequate legal protection. At the same time, this recog-
nition does not restrict the autonomy of the ones who are not willing to exercise such 
a freedom. Besides, in the democratic state, open debate about the theme remains free 
and possible, preserving the space for the moral disputes involved98.
This open conception of human dignity is required by the premises adopted in 
this paper. Notwithstanding, the conceptual openness of human dignity could repre-
sent a peril when used to test new candidates for the fundamental rights system. To 
diminish this peril, human dignity must be combined with other criteria and, conse-
quently, with norms and values underlying them. Also, it is important to rely upon the 
contributions of Robert Alexy and Jürgen Habermas – respecting their particular con-
ceptions – who approach human dignity through a discursive path, making its appro-
ach intersubjectively controllable. Following this path, human dignity does not claim 
a metaphysical morality leading to more defining and conceptualizing issues, it points 
to morality that can be intersubjectively exposed upon rational arguments, as already 
mentioned.
5.2.2 The individual as the reference 
When seeking the substantial fundamentality of new elements to possibly enter 
the fundamental rights system, the image of the rights holder is central to identify the 
goods that could require and deserve protection. One should be able to recall the ima-
ge of human being, person, individual member of a political community. A right, to be 
fundamental, must have this image as a reference. There must be a subjective point of 
normative imputation to which the right should refer.
From a complementary perspective, it must be affirmed that in the constitutio-
nal state, the individual is not isolated. The person must be regarded in its individual 
and unique aspects but as part of a political community. The understanding of the right 
98  BARROSO, Luís Roberto. A dignidade da pessoa humana no direito constitucional contemporâneo: a 
construção de um conceito jurídico à luz da jurisprudência mundial. Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2012, p. 105-106.
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holder in a dialectical relation between individual and community is required99. This 
implies that meta-individual needs and interests should also be considered100.
This circumstance can lead to a broadening path concerning the fundamental 
rights holder that results in weakening the meaning and value of fundamental rights. 
This devaluation is a consequence of the disconnection with the underlying norm of 
human dignity and the inadequacy of the legal protection means available. There are 
fundamental rights of collective exercise, and there are also collective rights asserted as 
fundamental and human rights. In these cases, however, it seems possible to still trace 
a strong connection between these rights and human dignity as legal protection for 
individuals. The question is whether this connection still holds if one grants fundamen-
tal rights to legal entities or even to depersonalized entities, such as the environment 
itself101.
It may be undeniable that new boundaries can and should be set for rights and 
all the elements concerned, including the definition of right holder. Nevertheless, if a 
concept or a legal instrument is artificially overstretched, it may lose its legal importan-
ce and significance. The question is not whether nature or animals, for example, deser-
ve legal protection, but whether this protection must be offered through directly gran-
ting them fundamental rights102. Further developments towards better legal protection 
of the Earth and its components, towards a less anthropocentric conception should be 
inevitable. Notwithstanding, instead of depleting legal means of their force, it may be 
more efficient to think of new frameworks. Not encompassing a situation within the 
framework of fundamental rights does not necessarily mean or lead to diminishing its 
legal importance or protection. It might, on the contrary, point to the need of concei-
ving more suitable legal protection. 
Bearing in mind the search for an adequate balance between openness and clo-
sure of the fundamental rights system, it is justifiable to require new rights to have the 
individual as its legal reference as explained above. This requirement guarantees the 
necessary connection with the underlying norm of human dignity. 
99  CORREIA, José Manuel Sérvulo. Direitos fundamentais: sumários. Lisboa: Associação Académica da Facul-
dade de Direito de Lisboa, 2002, p. 40.
100  For an interesting approach, see HACHEM, Daniel Wunder. A dupla titularidade (individual e transindivi-
dual) dos direitos fundamentais econômicos, sociais, culturais e ambientais. Revista de Direitos Fundamen-
tais e Democracia, v. 14, n. 14, Curitiba, p. 618-688, jul./dez. 2013.
101  For an approach to this discussion concerning the human right to a healthy environment, see BECKIUS, 
Louise.  The human right to a healthy environment. <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&-
source=web&cd=15&ved=2ahUKEwjA34zTopLnAhUS36QKHUgrABoQFjAOegQIBxAB&url=http%3A%2F%2F-
www.scriptiesonline.uba.uva.nl%2Fdocument%2F641667&usg=AOvVaw0UjZFcmARXkgfH24zR_xyc> 
Acessed 20 january 2020.
102  See the discussion in HACHEM, Daniel Wunder; GUSSOLI, Felipe Klein. Animais são sujeitos de direito no 
ordenamento jurídico brasileiro? Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal, Salvador, v. 13, n. 3, p. 141-172, set./
dez. 2017.
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5.2.3 Relevance to and connection with the fundamental rights norms explicitly positivi-
zed in the constitution
Relevant parameters to the compensatory constitutionalization of rights can be 
found in the substantial content protected by the constitution and by the fundamental 
rights system seen in an evolutive way. 
To what regards the explicit fundamental rights norms, a core guideline is the 
idea of indivisibility and interpenetration of fundamental rights. All fundamental rights 
norms converge to delivering human dignity103 the best protection and promotion pos-
sible within the constitutional system. They are called upon in a joint enterprise, even 
when one fundamental right norm is more specifically adequate to a particular case. 
Besides, the effectiveness of one right can have strong effects on the effectiveness of 
other rights, what can influence positively the normative force of the rights system as 
a whole.
There are differences in fundamental rights regimes in many constitutions, what 
leads to the traditionally known dichotomy between liberty, negative or defensive ri-
ghts, in the first place, and social or positive rights on the second place104. This to leave 
aside, at this moment, the so-called “third-generation” of rights. Many constitutions do 
not even positivize social rights explicitly; these rights must then be enumerated and 
developed through ordinary law, profiting from normative constitutional anchoring in 
general clauses, such as the welfare state or the principle of equality105. This cleavage 
103  PÉREZ LUÑO, Antonio Enrique. Derechos humanos, estado de derecho y constitución. 9.ed. Madrid: 
Tecnos, 2005, p. 89.
104  Pointing to the two categories, see STERN, Klaus. Idee und Elemente eines Systems der Grundrechte. In. 
ISENSEE, Josef; KIRCHHOF, Paul (Hrsg.). Handbuch des Staats Rechts. V, zweite Auflage. Heidelberg: Müller, 
2000, p. 70. As a very clear example of this dichotomy, see the Portuguese constitution, that treats separately 
what is calls “rights, freedoms and guarantees” from what are regarded as “social, cultural and economic rights”. 
It is substantially important to notice that the following rules, on rights regime, apply only to the first category, 
weakening the second. The text reads: “Article 17 (Regime governing rights, freedoms and guarantees) The regime 
governing rights, freedoms and guarantees applies to those set out in Title II and to fundamental rights of an anal-
ogous nature. Article 18 - (Legal force): I The constitutional precepts with regard to rights, freedoms and guarantees 
are directly applicable and are binding on public and private entities. II The law may only restrict rights, freedoms 
and guarantees in cases expressly provided for in the Constitution, and such restrictions must be limited to those 
needed to safeguard other constitutionally protected rights and interests. III Laws that restrict rights, freedoms and 
guarantees must have a general and abstract nature and may not have a retroactive effect or reduce the extent or 
scope of the essential content of the constitutional precepts.”
In the Brazilian constitutional text and practice the cleavage is not so clear as in the Portuguese context. None-
theless, is important to notice that the norm which commands immediate application to fundamental rights 
norms in enshrined in Article 5, which makes part of a chapter called “individual and collective rights and 
duties”. The social rights are enshrined in the next chapter.
105  It is interesting to notice that the German “fundamental law”, in which there is an almost complete lack of 
rights to state concrete provisions, enshrines dignity explicitly establishing that all public authorities have the 
duty to respect and protect human dignity (PIEROTH, Bodo; SCHLINK, Bernhard. Grundrechte, Staatsrecht II, 
11.ed., Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1995). Even when it is not possible to use this provision as an explicit root to 
rights to state concrete provisions, the idea of protection exceeds the prohibition of state interferences. See on 
the matter Ernst Benda, who cogitates of concrete provision duties, even related to an existential minimum 
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can also be found in international law instruments, coined in the expression “genera-
tion of rights” and to be seen in some of the most influential instruments, for example, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)106.
Besides this cleavage, which is still the most decisive in the conception and prac-
tice of fundamental and human rights, many other classifications exist in the attempt 
to achieve some abstract hierarchization of rights and coin differentiated enforcement 
regimes107. It seems clear that, in concrete cases, hierarchizations to solve conflicts 
between rights are unavoidable and result from the combined rule-principle model. 
This circumstance does not lead to the conclusion that fundamental and human rights 
should fit into rigid abstract hierarchized schemes; such a fixed conception could we-
aken some rights and, in consequence, all the system.
An alternative to these conceptions is built upon the deconstruction of many 
argumentation paths developed to rigidly hierarchize rights108 and upon the idea that 
fundamental and human rights are inherently intertwined, indivisible, inter dependab-
le; they are a system built to protect human dignity in its wholeness109.
In this scenario, the explicit enumeration or recognition of specific fundamental 
rights is not a neutral variable. On the one hand, as already mentioned, an excessive 
proliferation of rights should be approached carefully. On the other hand, autonomous 
rights explicitly established reassure specific fundamental contents that enhance hu-
man dignity protection; they alleviate the argumentation burden to anchor these con-
tents normatively. In addition, specific fundamental content might be called upon to 
support other fundamental rights and positions, reinforcing their protection and brin-
ging indivisibility, interpenetration and interdependence into light, strengthening the 
(BENDA, Ernst. Dignidad humana y derechos de la personalidad, p. 126). Also see ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los 
derechos fundamentales. 2.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2007, p. 434 ss
106  EIDE, Asbjørn. Economic, social and cultural rights as human rights. In: EIDE, Asbjørn; KRAUSE, Catarina; 
ROSAS, Allan. Economic, social and cultural rights: a textbook. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995, p. 21-40; 
SCHEININ, Martin. Economic, social and cultural rights as legal rights. In: EIDE, Asbjørn; KRAUSE, Catarina; RO-
SAS, Allan. Economic, social and cultural rights: a textbook. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995, p. 41-62; LEI-
JTEN Ingrid. Core socio-economic rights and the European Court of Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge, 
2018.
107  Jan Hendrik Klement wrote: “While all constitutional rights sit perfectly happily alongside each other in a basic 
rights order that is based solely on defensive rights, intra-constitutional rights conflicts are unavoidable in the con-
text of a pluralist model of basic rights. …” (KLEMENT, Jan Hendrik. Common law thinking in German jurispru-
dence. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 
2012, p. 184)
108  For an interesting “deconstructing” argumentation, see SUNSTEIN, Cass; HOLMES, Stephen. The cost of 
rights: why liberty depends on taxes. New York: Norton, 2013. For an approach based on the indivisibility of 
rights, see NETTO, Luísa Cristina Pinto e. O princípio de proibição de retrocesso social. Porto Alegre: Livraria 
do Advogado, 2010.
109  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights. Metaphiloso-
phy, vol. 41, no. 4, 2010, pp. 464–480. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24439631. Accessed 4 Jan. 2021, p. 464-480.
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whole system. A good example is the right to science, present in international instru-
ments but not in domestic constitutions. This right lends a good glance at the question 
when dealt with in combination with the right to health110; instead of a banalization of 
rights, the right to science can be of vital importance to guarantee health. Specific as-
pects that concern profiting from the benefits of scientific progress and its applications 
in order to protect and promote health become undeniable when the right to science 
is recognized.
The present criterion shows the need to compare the new right to the existing 
rights in the system concerning its capacity to protect and or promote human dignity. 
At this point, the question of whether a new candidate bears substantial fundamen-
tality could be stated as follows: has this candidate similar capacity of protecting and 
or promoting human dignity as the enumerated rights? Is this candidate essential or 
highly needed to guarantee or enhance the effectiveness of the enumerated funda-
mental rights?
If the candidate offers similar protection or promotion regarding human 
dignity and enhances the possibilities of the rights already present in the system, it 
scores positively in the test, adding in the argumentative path to its compensatory 
constitutionalization.
Through a somewhat different perspective, it is important to notice that the 
indivisibility, interpenetration, and interdependence of fundamental rights does not 
eliminate possible conflicts which will always make part of the application of the nor-
ms of the system. That is to say that the questions here presented do not deserve a 
negative answer based on possible frictions involving the new right and other rights in 
the system. A relation of complete compatibility among rights is not expected. What is 
expected is common axiological root leading back to human dignity in its complexity 
and multifaceted nature. It is not a problem that new rights which enter the fundamen-
tal rights system collide with other specific rights; they ought to share the necessary 
foundations of the constitutional and of the fundamental rights system, integrating 
themselves in the common axiological heritage construed by the constituent power.
5.2.4 Relevance to and connection with the structuring elements of the fundamental ri-
ghts system 
New candidates to enter the fundamental rights system, as stated above, do not 
need to show compatibility with all encompassed rights; both rights and structuring 
elements can come into tension, reflecting the various and contradicting values which 
110  DONDERS, Yvonne. The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress: in search of state obligations in re-
lation to health. 2011. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, vol. 14, n. 4, 371-381. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11019-011-9327-y.
LUÍSA NETTO
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 11-75, jan./abr. 2021.52 
underlay the constitutional system and permanently seek adequation within the sys-
tem. The very core of the constitutional and the rights systems carry values that often 
ask for compromise111; the unity of the systems is much more something to be dynami-
cally pursued than a static given.
This is the background for testing new candidates in their relevance to and con-
nection with the structuring elements of the fundamental rights system. The identity 
of the two systems involved should be preserved and promoted by the welcoming of 
new fundamental content, respecting the constituent choices in its evolving historicity. 
New candidates ought to comfortably fit in a system coined by human dignity, equality, 
freedom and solidarity. Their contents should serve the updating of this core elements.
5.2.5 Relevance to and connection with the structuring principles of the constitutional 
state
Following the same idea exposed above for the elements of the fundamental 
rights system, it is expected from candidates to enter this system that they are relevant 
and can connect to the structuring elements and principles of the constitutional state 
and its legal order. The goal of this criterion is to warrant that the welcoming of a new 
right will not distort the sound bonds that must tie fundamental rights and the axiolo-
gical constitutional tissue. All rights, originally established in the constitutional text or 
resulting from compensatory constitutionalization, ought to integrate into the consti-
tuent axiological heritage112 of the democratic state.
5.2.6 Closeness to the international standards on human rights 
The difference between fundamental and human rights has already been poin-
ted out. Nonetheless, substantial intersections between the categories can be found. 
Besides, the interplay between the domestic and the international protection of rights 
is decisive and holds a central role when conceiving the domestic rights systems as 
open. 
It is not possible to approach rights protection at present letting aside that sta-
tes and their legal systems are embedded in a vast world of multilevel jurisdictions and 
mutual influences. As noticed above, an especially meaningful way in which the funda-
mental rights system openness operates is towards international law, as states are part 
of an international and global order. 
111  ZAGREBELSKY, Gustavo. El derecho dúctil: ley, derechos, justicia. 8.ed. Madrid: Trotta, 2008, p. 75 ss.
112  HERRERA, Miguel Angel García. Prólogo a la segunda edición. In: BENDA, Ernst; MAIHOFER, Werner; VOGEL, 
Hans-Jochen; HESSE, Konrad; HEYDE, Wolfgang. Manual de derecho constitucional. 2.ed. Madrid: Marcial 
Pons, 2001, p. XLIII-LIX.
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On the interpretation level, the openness is seen through the mutual influen-
ce exerted on national and international legal spheres, generalizing the tendency of a 
broad and continuous dialogue between diverse courts. Moreover, international norms 
with or without jus cogens nature which impose themselves or influence domestic sys-
tems openness are visibly increasing. It is possible to find a standardization of rights 
legal instruments. It is also possible to affirm that human or fundamental rights are 
regarded as intangible by states113; they are no longer confined in the space of grants 
given by states to their citizens.
In the face of these phenomena, the search for substantial fundamentality gains 
support by anchoring new rights in international norms or standards. If the new can-
didate for a domestic rights system is anchored in international norms and is closely 
related to international provisions or standards, this contributes positively to the argu-
mentation in favour of the candidate. This anchoring works as a vestige, a trace of its 
substantial fundamentality.
Certainly, this must be one criterion within multiple criteria. It is essential not to 
take international standards negatively, as they might, in occasions, offer a minimum 
level of protection. This circumstance should not conduct to denying compensatory 
constitutionalization to a candidate which represents a higher level of protection. The 
candidates must undergo the test regarding the other criteria and regarding the spe-
cificities of the domestic system in question. This aspect is also relevant because the 
international standards might need to be seen in the light of the historical and cultural 
idiosyncrasies of the concrete political community.
5.2.7 Justifiability
Candidates to compensatory constitutionalization must be able to be appro-
priately and sufficiently justified. It must be possible to develop and present rational 
justification in favour of the new right.
This criterion is the corollary of the other parameters, it brings the testing task to 
completion, disclosing the whole process. This criterion reveals how all the other crite-
ria were dealt with and, by doing so, it renders this operation rationally controllable. In 
brief, justifiability unveils that, if the argumentative burden in favour of the compensa-
tory constitutionalization of a right is adequately accomplished, the door to the rights 
system is open.
Justifiability as a parameter was developed counting on contributions from Jür-
gen Habermas’ critical theory. His general reconstruction of modern legal orders and 
113  PETERS, Anne. Are we moving towards constitutionalization of the world community? In: CASSESE, Anto-
nio. Realizing utopia: the future of international law. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 119-135; PETERS, Anne. Human-
ity as the A and Ω of sovereignty. The European Journal of International Law, 2009, v. 20, n. 3, p. 513-544.
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the system of rights, using the discourse principle, is called upon to justify the compen-
satory constitutionalization of fundamental rights not formally enshrined in the consti-
tution. In addition, his idea of the co-originality of autonomies is also important; private 
and public autonomy have equal weight and, therefore, individuals should not only be 
the addressees of law but also its authors114.
In Habermas’ construction, it is possible to find an adequate contribution to un-
derstand modern society as post-metaphysical and, as such, a society within which a 
pluralism of visions must cohabitate using law as means of social coordination. In this 
scenario, the modern commitment to the medium of the law is central as there is no 
possible reach to a metaphysical response. This commitment requires “a system of sta-
tutes to ensure that every future member of the association counts as a bearer of Individual 
rights”115.
Habermas’ theory, which is not exempt to criticism, is extremely suitable for the 
pursuit of criteria to identify substantial fundamentality of “new” rights. Justification 
through rational discursive procedures becomes mandatory to the construction and 
operation of the openness of the rights system. The goal is to approach the rights the 
citizens must grant each other if they want to legitimately regulate their coexistence 
through positive law. Habermas seeks to give foundation to an abstract rights system 
recurring to the principle of discourse. Hence, his theory, even broad and general, deli-
vers a sound departing point to the justification procedure of compensatory constitu-
tionalization of rights.
The co-originality of subjective rights and objective law, of private and public 
autonomy, and an undetachable internal nexus between rights and the principle of po-
pular sovereignty are central aspects in the reconstruction of law carried out by Haber-
mas. He connects private and public autonomy utilizing a legal content of the political 
autonomy exercise: the discursive formation of opInion and will. The reconstruction of 
the rights systems of modern societies rests upon self-determination and self-legisla-
tion through rational discursive procedures leading to form rational will. The system of 
rights should legally institutionalize the conditions required by these discursive proce-
dures. These conditions are necessary to endow the partners in law to obtain politically 
autonomous legislation116.
Precisely departing from the co-originality of public and private autonomy, 
Habermas avoids the possibility of a moral interpretation of rights; the addressees of 
114  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012.
115  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012, p. 144-146.
116  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012, p. 137 ss.
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rights are their very authors. He does not admit a moral right to liberties as an external 
boundary imposed on the legislator. He only acknowledges the content of rights as 
a formal condition to the discursive formation of opinion and will117. Equal rights and 
liberties must be understood through politically autonomous legislation. This leads to 
affirm that self-legislation does not mean a moral self-legislation of singular individuals; 
self-legislation is connected to the principle of discourse and to the legal form. The re-
sult is the principle of democracy, which is the core of the rights system118. 
This construction and its elements can suitably engage in the conception of law 
presenting a claim to correctness, as drafted above. The need for justification found in 
Habermas, which makes the individual at the same time addressee and author of the 
legal order (especially regarding the system of rights), supports the claim to correct-
ness. This claim is not externally or heteronomously imposed by a moral order superior 
to law. Claim to correctness – substantial requirements to a “correct” law – must be un-
derstood as a result construed through rational discursive procedures within histori-
cal-political contexts. Politically autonomous legislation is made in concrete settings 
which enable to identify substantial requirements – also through rational, discursive 
procedures – needed by law and the rights system to be legitimate. 
Habermas, on his general level of cogitation, does not indicate substantial bou-
ndaries for this self-legislation. On the level before the concrete organization of the 
state, he indicates indispensable rights required by a “legitimate” law, affirming that 
they ought to be structured by the legislator119. In other words, he reaffirms the co-ori-
ginality of the public and private autonomy.
Departing from the liaison between people sovereignty and fundamental ri-
ghts, Habermas proceeds to the reconstruction of the rights system in an “explanatory 
or comprehension theoretical exercise”. The construction of a concrete rights system by 
the constituent power should presuppose the principle of discourse and the legal form; 
the liberty rights are the necessary enabling conditions to establish the “legal code” 
once they are the means to the exercise of political autonomy. Habermas does not con-
ceive the rights system as originated in natural law or in a moral order superior to law 
that should only be translated into law by the constituent power. As mentioned, he 
avoids this “duplication” of law; law is not a reproduction of morality120. 
117  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012, p. 164.
118  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012, p. 162-163.
119  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012, p. 164-166.
120  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012, p. 166.
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In the context of legal orders not grounded in metaphysical or religious fou-
ndations, practical guidance can only be approached rationally through argumenta-
tion. The understanding of the connection between law and morality is of paramount 
importance. Morality is not to be duplicated into law. Therefore, it is necessary to use 
rational argumentation to agree on the validity of norms to guide actions.
This conception warrants the centrality of the human person which is indispen-
sable to the construction presented in this paper. The individual is not only the ad-
dressee of the legal order, but the author of this order through political autonomy. The 
decisions about the rights systems in modern democratic societies can only be taken 
employing this autonomy, using rational discursive procedures. It is continuously ne-
cessary to reach renewed moral consensus, procedurally forged, to determine which 
rights are indispensable to the participation in the democratic discourse121. 
Without adhering completely to Habermas’ critical theory, what would require 
developments that go far beyond the goal of this paper, it is crucial to retain that Ha-
bermas’ conception of the system of rights is situated within a discursive comprehen-
sion of law. This reveals the umbilical connection between democracy and rights. In 
his theory, the construction of law results from the exercise of political autonomy by 
citizens. Translating these ideas into the theme of the paper, it is possible to assert that 
the decision of which rights deserve compensatory constitutionalization is central to 
structuring the state and the political community122.
The rights system is for Habermas the heart of the legitimate law; without such 
a system, there is no legitimacy in law. This is a bridge to bind Habermas’ and Alexy’s 
theories in delivering the adequate theoretical foundation to the openness of the fun-
damental rights system and the criteria for the compensatory constitutionalization. The 
idea of legitimate law approaches the conception of law holding a claim to correct-
ness; both do not strive for a transcendental morality but ask for a rationally discursively 
construed morality.
The necessity of taking decisions through rational discursive processes makes 
more sense when linked to the need to justify these decisions. This emphasizes that 
legal reasoning and legal argumentation ought to be carried within rational criteria. 
Law holds a claim to correctness, but not only law as a system. This claim also spreads 
itself to the norms and decisions taken within the system. Justifiability comes into play. 
121  BUSTAMANTE, Thomas da Rosa de. Teoria do precedente judicial: a justificação e a aplicação de regras 
jurisprudenciais. São Paulo: Noeses, 2012, p. 158
122  Matthias Klatt points out that, according to Robert Alexy, the role of fundamental rights in legal system is 
characterized by the fact that they represent highly relevant issues for individuals and society (KLATT, Matthias. 
Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurispru-
dence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 7). See ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales. 
2.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2007, p. 462-463.
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The claim to correctness, as here understood, leads inevitably to a claim to justification; 
correctness implies justifiability123.
According to Robert Alexy, legal reasoning ought to enable the logical inferen-
ces which provide internal justification, and which reveal the premises that require ex-
ternal justification124. His legal argumentation theory must be combined with his non-
-positivist law’s conception; it is not possible to fulfil the claim to justifiability recurring 
exclusively to normative provisions and authoritative arguments. At this point, atten-
tion is drawn upon the necessary connection between law and morality. If law, with its 
open texture, leads to more than one interpretation possible, but if there is a moral ar-
gument that favours one interpretation, this one ought to be chosen, fulfilling the claim 
to correctness. This choice should be justifiable through legal rational argumentation, 
fulfilling, by its turn, the claim to justifiability125.
A significant criticism can be delivered on this understanding; an undesirable 
and unacceptable identification between law and morality126. This criticism can be dealt 
with using Robert Alexy’s comprehension of fundamental rights related to his non-po-
sitivistic law’s conception. It is possible to assert the existence per se of fundamental 
rights conceiving them as elementary moral postulates and explaining the connection 
between law and morality as a classificatory relation in which fundamental rights are 
central. On the one hand, fundamental rights imply the use of moral considerations to 
justify themselves. On the other hand, they avoid these ethical considerations from co-
lonizing law completely. Fundamental rights deliver an important contribution to ba-
lancing the tension caused by the necessary connection between law and morality127.
123  KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized 
reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 15-16. See also ALEXY, Robert. The argu-
ment from injustice: a reply to legal positivism. Oxford: Oxford, 2002, p. 76 ss.
124  KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized 
reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 3-4.
125  KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized 
reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 15 ss.
126  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012, p. 139 ss.
127  KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized 
reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 15 ss. Robert Alexy distinguishes between 
rules and principles and asserts that this distinction and the principial comprehension of fundamental rights 
leads to the necessary connection between law and morality. This happens by means of three theses: the 
thesis of incorporation (all legal system has principles), the morality thesis (the incorporation of principles in 
the system leads to the necessary connection between law and critical morality); the correctness thesis (there 
is a necessary connection between law and morality). This relation is linked to the dual nature of law – real and 
ideal – asserted by Alexy, having consequences on his concept of law and on legal argumentation. Matthias 
Klatt writes: “legal argumentation implies moral reasoning” (KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as 
system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 
2012, p. 22). See also KLATT, Matthias; MEISTER, Moritz. The constitutional structure of proportionality. Oxford: 
Oxford, 2012.184 p.
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Robert Alexy’s conception of fundamental rights as elementary moral postula-
tes can be related to the habermasian idea that there are moral requirements imposed 
by the principle of discourse. This is especially relevant regarding fundamental rights 
without which the legitimate production of legal norms is not viable. These require-
ments amount over historical time and construct themselves as indispensable; these 
requirements become incorporated in humanity legal and moral heritage. It is not ne-
cessary to recall realist thesis over a substantial moral content to law; it is possible to 
try a rational justification to this content considering it as “defInitive moral learnIng pro-
pitiated by modernity”128. This comprehension on Habermas’ theory can be found in his 
latest works. It provides for a foundation for fundamental rights linked with the com-
plementarity between by law and morality construed through this discursive “moral 
learning”129. 
In this scenario, the justification of fundamental rights requires a morality which 
is rationally construed and whose grounding arguments can be exposed through argu-
mentation130. This is certainly an aspect that enables congregating elements from both 
Alexy’s and Habermas’ theories.
A pivotal element to Robert Alexy’s construction viewed systematically is law’s 
discursive rationality131. His claim to correctness and the relation between law and mo-
rality refers to a broad notion of justice, gathering ethic, pragmatic and moral aspects of 
correctness132. In Alexy’s theory, the connection between fundamental rights and legal 
argumentation is close, deep and complex. Their normative structure as legal principles 
implies the institutional need for balancing and, therefore, of recurring to the theory of 
legal argumentation. Balancing must be done in a rational and controllable way. The 
relation between law and morality presents an institutional dimension, which means 
rights institutionalization in a legal system with constitutional review. The legal system 
128  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasilei-
ro, 2012, p. 166; BUSTAMANTE, Thomas da Rosa de. Teoria do precedente judicial: a justificação e a aplicação 
de regras jurisprudenciais. São Paulo: Noeses, 2012, p. 157-158.
129  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights. Metaphiloso-
phy, vol. 41, no. 4, 2010, pp. 464–480. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24439631. Accessed 4 Jan. 2021, p. 464-480.
130  KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized 
reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 22.
131  KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized 
reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 22.
132  This interpretation can be found in Maeve Cooke: “It is an open question what justice in the broader sense 
requires. This follows from the view of concepts, together with the discourse-theoretical approach to validity, that I 
have attributed to Alexy. I have suggested that these lead to a conception of legal philosophy in which the claims to 
correctness raised for concepts of law are subject to critical evaluation in open-ended processes of argumentation. 
This holds for the concept of justice as much as for the concept of law.” (COOKE, Maeve. The dual character of con-
cepts and the discourse theory of law. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of 
Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 283)
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must incorporate equality and liberty reclaimed by legal discourse; it must constitute a 
discursive democracy133.
From another perspective, law’s open texture and the limits of discursive ra-
tionality bring to light the importance of law’s real dimension, its positivity. Because 
discourse norms do not lead to one correct answer or interpretation but can deliver 
different solutions revealing reasonable moral disagreements, positive legal norms are 
necessary to provide a definitive solution. Robert Alexy names this as InstitutionalizIng 
reason, which culminates in the political form of liberal democracy, of discursive cons-
titutionalism. This political form guarantees, at the same time, democracy and funda-
mental rights134. Legal discourse requires that democracy and fundamental rights are 
incorporated in the legal system. Democracy because dialogue only can be realized in 
deliberative democracy; fundamental rights because discourse is based on liberty and 
equality135.
Without disregarding relevant points of contrast and friction between Jürgen 
Habermas’ and Robert Alexy’s theories, the reasoning developed above made it possi-
ble to find approaching elements between them. These elements enable to work with 
both constructions as substantial ground for the ideas and conclusions developed in 
this paper. The first author contrasts facticity with validity, the second affirms the dual 
nature of law – one real dimension and one ideal or critical. The first presents a system 
of rights without which a legitimate law in unviable; the second understands funda-
mental rights are indispensable to law’s claim to correctness. The first asserts that the ri-
ghts system ought to enable the legal institutionalization of the conditions required by 
the discursive procedures136; the second affirms that the legal system, because of dis-
cursive claims, requires fundamental moral values in the form of fundamental rights137.
133  KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized 
reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 19 ss. On page 23 this piece on the connec-
tion between fundamental rights and discourse can be found: “… In the philosophical dimension, basic rights 
are justified with the help of the discourse thesis. In the political dimension, discourse theory specifies a particular 
political form for the institutionalization of basic rights. In the juridical dimension, the theory of balancing as a part 
of the principles thesis contributes to the theory of legal argumentation as a whole.”
134  ALEXY, Robert. Teoria do discurso e sistema jurídico. In: ALEXY, Robert. Teoria discursiva do Direito. Rio 
de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 2014, p. 87-89; KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. 
In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, 
p. 22-25.
135  KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized 
reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 22-25
136  LAFONT, Cristina. Correctness and legitimacy in the discourse theory of law. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Insti-
tutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 291-306.
137  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. v. I. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Bra-
sileiro, 2012, p. 137 ss; KLATT, Matthias. Robert Alexy’s philosophy of law as system. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). 
Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 24; ALEXY, Robert. Com-
ments and responses. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. 
Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 329-330/353, footnote 121. Robert Alexy explains that, in many cases, the reasonable 
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Maybe the link to connect the two theoretical constructions in this present pa-
per is to be found in the goals of law’s discursive theories: “the defence of moral cogniti-
vism, of norms’ claim to correctness, of the rational justifiability of norms, of the importance 
of political deliberation for democratic legitimacy”138. Briefly, what is at stake is exposing 
the relationship between discursive agreements and the validity of legal norms.
This discursive conception of law and its application in the justification of ri-
ghts, identifying their substantial fundamentality, suit the comprehension of the legal 
system and of an open fundamental rights system that underly the whole conception 
exposed in this paper. The aim to be achieved through compensatory constitutionali-
zation, either on the interpretative level or on the normative creation level, is not to dis-
cover rights in a transcendental moral order and affirm them as legally binding. The aim 
is to justify the recognition of elements that ought to take part in the rights system be-
cause of their relevance for human dignity within a democratic state. This justification is 
construed through rational discursive procedures that sustain the decision of affirming 
the substantial fundamentality of new rights. Certainly, the procedures may reckon on 
moral considerations which should undergo rational discursive requirements. 
The rational and the discursive aspects involved in the justifiability of the can-
didates to enter the fundamental rights system are essential to the ideas of legitimate 
law and law’s claim to correctness. Only through discursive processes that are conduc-
ted by reason can the rationality of the identification of substantial fundamentality be 
affirmed, avoiding considerations based on natural law or on a transcendent moral or-
der. Besides, justifiability links itself to the possibility of rational discursive procedures; 
the substantial fundamentality of the candidates is grounded in their necessity and 
relevance to the viability of these very discursive procedures. Candidates to enter the 
system should show their importance for guaranteeing the rational discursive pro-
cedures, their importance to discursive constitutionalism, to both public and private 
autonomies.
If the task is fulfilled, i.e., if the argumentative burden is carried out in the face 
of the criteria presented above in favour of a candidate to enter the fundamental ri-
ghts system, its substantial fundamentality should be recognized. Undoubtedly, it is 
a complex and multifaceted argumentative pathway; it is not enough to demonstrate 
disagreement cannot be solved because discourse is not a procedure which is able to always conduct to a one 
right answer. Even though, there are cases in which it is possible to solve the disagreement by means of what 
is discursively necessary. This is the case for fundamental rights and democracy. 
For a comparison between the ideas of correctness and legitimacy in the discursive theories of Robert Alexy 
and Jürgen Habermas, see, LAFONT, Cristina. Correctness and legitimacy in the discourse theory of law. In: 
KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, 
p. 291-306.
138  LAFONT, Cristina. Correctness and legitimacy in the discourse theory of law. In: KLATT, Matthias (ed.). Insti-
tutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford, 2012, p. 291.
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the existence and validity of a legal norm entailing a right. This path requires the de-
monstration that a legal and valid legal norm conveys a right claimed by the central 
issues concerning the political community and the state, a right without which human 
dignity protection cannot be guaranteed and, consequently, without which there is no 
legitimate law, no law that fulfils the claim to correctness.
The task involves moral considerations and cannot deliver results exempt from 
controversy. Absolute objectivity is not attainable, a right answer to all the hypothe-
ses is not feasible. If complete objectivity is not achievable, it does not follow that the 
process is irrational. The goal of the process of testing new candidates and trying to 
identify their substantial fundamentality, with the help of legal argumentation, is to 
expose this test submitting it to an argumentative path where justification and inter-
subjectivity control are required139. 
Finally, justifiability also concerns the necessity of indicating a valid legal pro-
vision that functions as the legal source of the candidate to enter the rights system. 
If the candidate is a derivative (implicit) norm, in its justification process the explicit 
provisions to which it is anchored should be presented. It is possible in this case to re-
ckon on interpretation assertions made before; the operation to derivate a norm from 
explicit provisions depends on legal argumentation140. In other cases, the legal source 
of the candidate will be an ordinary law provision or an international law instrument 
provision, as hereafter explained. 
5.2.8 Suitability of the source 
As a last aspect, in the testing process of new rights it is important to answer 
the question about which normative source is suitable to establish a right that could be 
considered fundamental and deserve compensatory constitutionalization.
All the exposition in this paper assumes a general character as pointed out in 
the beginning. It is hence important to notice that, when considering a specific consti-
tutional system, attention must be paid to the concrete norms of the system, especially 
regarding the accepted sources of law. 
Moral argumentation can undoubtedly play a role in asserting the need to cons-
titutionalize a right recognizing its substantial fundamentality, but this is not enough 
to include the right in the legal system as a valid norm. Even when the incomplete-
ness of the formal constitution is recognized and when the need to compensatory 
139  Carlos Bernal Pulido asserts that absolute objectivity is an utopia, not attainable in any normative domain 
(PULIDO, Carlos Bernal. Estudio introductorio. In: ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales. Ma-
drid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2007, p. XLV). See also ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los dere-
chos fundamentales. 2.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2007, p. 486 ss.
140  ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales. 2.ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Cons-
titucionales, 2007, p. 53-55.
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constitutionalization of rights required by the claim to correctness is advocated, it is 
inevitable to respect a formal criterion to identify the acceptable legal sources. Othe-
rwise, law as a system would collapse.
This circumstance is even more relevant since Robert Alexy’s and Jürgen Ha-
bermas’ theories were the basis of the argumentative pathway structured to test new 
candidates to the rights system. Their contribution to the theoretical level must find 
ground in the real dimension of law, within positivized valid law. This formal require-
ment can be regarded as a requirement of law as a positive construction. Besides, it 
is required by the necessary imbrication of rights and democracy, the co-originality 
of private and public autonomy. There must be a sufficiently institutionalized form of 
production of a provision to render it legally binding, making it a legal source able to 
convey a fundamental right.
The requirement that a formal criterion is fulfilled does not make the compensa-
tory constitutionalization of rights impossible. As assumed that rights and democracy 
must coexist in the constitutional state, the fulfilment of a formal criterion is essential. If 
it is viable to come discursively to an agreement on the need of a right to the protection 
of human dignity based on substantial reasons rationally explainable, it should also be 
possible to convey it through a suitable legal provision.
6. CLOSING REMARKS
History and its evolving circumstances enable human dignity to unfold. At the 
same time, these circumstances present human dignity with renewed threats, which 
require that the set of rights positivized in states constitutions and in international law 
also evolve in order to effectively warrant human dignity. Hence, these systems of ri-
ghts must be conceived as open systems, capable of accepting and accommodating 
new interpretations and new rights.
The openness of the rights system was here addressed as a broader phenome-
non which goes beyond the existence of explicit open clauses for new rights. Openness 
can operate on the levels of interpretation and of normative creation through different 
paths – originated from law’s nature, derived from an implicit principle, and imposed by 
the interaction between national and international law – and counting on various ways 
of realization – legislative concretization of fundamental rights, judicial application of 
law, explicit open clauses, constitutional amendment, and impositions from interna-
tional law. Openness assures the updating capacity of the rights system in favour of 
human dignity.
Human and fundamental rights are powerful legal means to protect and pro-
mote human dignity. Nonetheless, it does not simply follow that the more rights, the 
better human dignity will be guaranteed. On the one hand, the recognition of implicit 
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and new rights appears unavoidable and desirable. On the other hand, it can lead to ri-
ghts proliferation with deleterious effects, among others, on the domestic separation of 
powers, on the capacity of states to guarantee rights, on the normative force of rights. 
An artificial proliferation of rights can weaken rights’ legal and political worth; when 
everything is fundamental, nothing is really fundamental.
The possible aspects of an alleged rights overreach are being called into discus-
sion domestically and internationally, midst globalization, the growing populist belt 
worldwide, migration and environmental challenges.
It is crucial to bear in mind the importance of rights beyond aspirational pos-
tulates, as effective legal means to protect human dignity, which imply feasible obli-
gations. In this scenario, it is urgent to offer theoretical foundations to the openness 
of the fundamental rights system. The presentation of these theoretical foundations 
in this paper intended to preserve the core values and elements of the system, and to 
prevent the denaturation of the concept of rights. The set of rights granted the status 
of fundamental or human rights cannot expand limitless; openness must be combined 
with some degree of closure.
The search for balance between openness and closure was addressed in this 
paper by presenting and exploring a set of criteria to identify the substantial funda-
mentality of rights. These criteria should guide every update of the system by revealing 
the presence of substantial fundamentality in rights not formally enshrined in the cons-
titutional text. The criteria function as parameters to the compensatory constitutionali-
zation of rights; the criteria should be applied to candidates entering the fundamental 
rights system either by the door of interpretation – implicit rights – or by the door of 
normative creation – new rights. This testing path was structured as an attempt to scru-
tinize “new” rights and verify if they should be granted the status of fundamental right.
Eventually, the paper exposed the reasoning needed in testing implicit and new 
rights. This complex testing task can only be fulfilled by leaning on legal argumentation 
and interpretation theories; it is a discursive process that must be conducted by rational 
and intersubjectively controllable argumentation.
The construction of criteria to scrutinize new rights engages in the effort to 
readdress the rights discourse and protect rights against artificial proliferation. As a 
following research step, it seems necessary to put these very criteria to test in order to 
verify their usefulness. A complementary development, hence, should lead to applying 
the criteria to alleged new rights, such as a right to science141 or a right to internet 
141  The affirmation of the right to science as an autonomous fundamental right which merits compensatory 
constitutionalization was the central focus of my postdoc research period at Amsterdam University (ACIL-UVA). 
A paper on the subject is being prepared.
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access142, among many others. This further elaboration, besides a more concrete aspect, 
should not disregard the need to delve into the increasing challenges posed to demo-
cracy and their possible consequences on rights.
At the end is seems imperative to conclude that the attempt to offer mechanis-
ms to maintain the rights system open as well as to prevent the artificial proliferation 
of rights is not able to deliver an absolute answer, it lays in a discursive process that 
reinforces the mutual relation between rights and democracy. 
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